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a b s t r a c t
Tropical polyhedra have been recently used to represent disjunc-
tive invariants in static analysis. To handle larger instances, trop-
ical analogues of classical linear programming results need to be
developed. This motivation leads us to study the tropical analogue
of the classical linear-fractional programming problem. We con-
struct an associated parametric mean payoff game problem, and
show that the optimality of a given point, or the unboundedness of
the problem, can be certified by exhibiting a strategy for one of the
players having certain infinitesimal properties (involving the value
of the game and its derivative) that we characterize combinatori-
ally. We use this idea to design a Newton-like algorithm to solve
tropical linear-fractional programming problems, by reduction to
a sequence of auxiliary mean payoff game problems.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation from static analysis
Tropical algebra is the structure in which the set of real numbers, completed with −∞, is
equipped with the ‘‘additive’’ law ‘‘a + b’’ := a ∨ b = max(a, b) and the ‘‘multiplicative’’ law
‘‘ab’’ := a + b. The max-plus or tropical analogues of convex sets have been studied by a number
of authors (Zimmermann, 1977; Cuninghame-Green, 1979; Gaubert and Plus, 1997; Litvinov et al.,
2001; Cohen et al., 2004; Develin and Sturmfels, 2004; Briec and Horvath, 2004; Joswig, 2005), under
various names (idempotent spaces, semimodules, B-convexity, extremal convexity), with different
degrees of generality, and various motivations.
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Fig. 1. The tropical polyhedral abstraction of a transfer function, following (Allamigeon et al., 2008), versus the classical
polyhedral abstraction. The optimal invariant is represented by the union of two half-lines. The tropical over-approximation
of this behavior (union of the triangle in dark gray and of the half-lines, left) is more accurate than the classical polyhedral one
(cone in light gray, right).
In a recent work, Allamigeon et al. (2008) have used tropical polyhedra to compute disjunctive
invariants in static analysis. A general (affine) tropical polyhedron can be represented as
P :=

x ∈ (R ∪ {−∞})n |

j∈[n]
(aij + xj)

∨ ci ≤

j∈[n]
(bij + xj)

∨ di,∀i ∈ [m]

. (1)
Here, we use the notation [n] := {1, . . . , n}, and the parameters aij, bij, ci and di are given, with values
in R∪ {−∞}. The analogy with classical polyhedra becomes clearer with the tropical notation, which
allows us to write the constraints as ‘‘Ax + c ≤ Bx + d’’, to be compared with classical systems of
linear inequalities, Ax ≤ d (in the tropical setting, we need to consider affine functions on both sides
of the inequality due to the absence of opposite law for addition). The previous representation of P is
the analogue of the external representation of polyhedra, as the intersection of half-spaces. As in the
classical case, tropical polyhedra have a dual (internal) representation, which involves extreme points
and extreme rays. The tropical analogue of theMotzkin double descriptionmethod allows one to pass
from one representation to the other (Allamigeon et al., 2010).
Disjunctive invariants arise naturally when analyzing sorting algorithms or in the verification of
string manipulation programs. The well known memcpy function of C is discussed in (Allamigeon
et al., 2008) as a simple illustration: when copying the first n characters of a string buffer src to
a string buffer dst, the length len_dst of the latter buffer may differ from the length len_src
of the former, for if n is smaller than len_src, the null terminal character of the buffer src is not
copied. However, the relation min(len_src, n) = min(len_dst, n) is valid. This can be expressed
geometrically by saying that the vector (−len_src,−len_dst) belongs to a tropical polyhedron.
Several examples of programs of a disjunctive nature, which are analyzed by means of tropical
polyhedra, can be found in (Allamigeon et al., 2008; Allamigeon, 2009), in which the tropical analogue
of the classical polyhedra-based abstract interpretation method of (Cousot and Halbwachs, 1978) has
been developed.
The comparative interest of tropical polyhedra is illustrated in Fig. 1, which gives a simple fragment
of code in which the tropical invariant is tighter. Note that there is still an over-approximation in
the tropical case, because the transfer function considered here is discontinuous (tropical polyhedra
share with classical polyhedra the property of being connected, and therefore cannot represent
exactly such discontinuities). Such tropical invariants can be obtained automatically via the methods
of (Allamigeon et al., 2008; Allamigeon, 2009), which rely on the tropical analogue of the double
description algorithm (Allamigeon et al., 2010), allowing one to obtain the vertices of a tropical
polyhedron from a family of defining inequalities, and vice versa.
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As in the case of classical polyhedra, the scalability of the approach is inherently limited by the
exponential blow up of the size of representations of polyhedra, since the number of vertices or of
defining inequalities can be exponential in the size of the input data (Allamigeon et al., 2011a,b).
The complexity of earlier polyhedral approaches led Sankaranarayanan et al. (2005, 2006) to
introduce the method of templates. In a nutshell, a template consists of a finite set T = {g1, . . . , gm}
of linear forms on Rn. The latter define a parametric family of polyhedra
Pα = {x ∈ Rn | gk(x) ≤ αk , k ∈ [m]}
with precisely m degrees of freedom α1, . . . , αm ∈ R ∪ {+∞}. The classical domains of boxes or the
domain of zones (potential constraints) (Miné, 2004) are recovered by incorporating in the template
the linear forms g(x) = ±xi or g(x) = xi − xj, respectively. Fixing the template, or changing it
dynamically while keepingm bounded, avoids the exponential blow up.
The method of (Sankaranarayanan et al., 2006) relies critically on linear programming, which
allows one to evaluate quickly the fixed point functional of abstract interpretation. However, the
precision of the invariants remains limited by the linear nature of templates, and it is natural to ask
whether the machinery of templates carries over to the non-linear case.
The formalism of templates has been extended to the non-linear case by Adjé et al. (2010), who
considered specially quadratic templates, the linear programming methods of (Sankaranarayanan
et al., 2006) being replaced by semidefinite programming, thanks to Shor’s relaxation. More generally,
every tractable subclass of optimization problems yields a tractable template.
In order to compute disjunctive invariants, Allamigeon, Gaubert andGoubault suggested to develop
a generalization of the template method to the case of tropical polyhedra. As a preliminary step, the
relevant results of linear programming must be tropicalized: this is the object of the present paper.
In particular, comparing the expressions of P and Pα , we see that the classical linear forms must
now be replaced by the differences of tropical affine forms
g(x) =

j∈[n]
(pj + xj) ∨ r

−

j∈[n]
(qj + xj) ∨ s

(2)
where pj, r , qj and s are given parameters with values in R ∪ {−∞}.
1.2. The problem
In this paper, we study the following tropical linear-fractional programming problem:
minimize g(x)
subject to: x ∈ P (3)
where P is given by (1) and g is given by (2). This is the tropical analogue of the classical linear-
fractional programming problem
minimize (px+ r)/(qx+ s)
subject to: Ax+ c ≤ Bx+ d, x ≥ 0, x ∈ Rn
where p, q are nonnegative vectors, r , s are nonnegative scalars, and A, B, c , d are matrices and vectors.
The constraint ‘‘x ≥ 0’’ is implicit in (3), since any number is ‘‘nonnegative’’ (i.e.,≥ −∞) in the tropical
world.
Problem (3) includes as special cases
g(x) =

j∈[n]
(pj + xj) and g(x) = −

j∈[n]
(qj + xj) (4)
(take qj ≡ −∞, r = −∞ and s = 0, or pj ≡ −∞, s = −∞ and r = 0). According to the
terminology of (Butkovič and Aminu, 2008), the latter may be thought of as the tropical analogues
of the linear programming problem. However, optimizing the more general fractional objective
function (2) appears to be needed in a number of basic applications. In particular, in static analysis,
we need typically to compute the tightest inequality of the form xi ≤ K + xj satisfied by the elements
of P . This fits in the general form (2), but not in the special cases (4).
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1.3. Contribution
Abasic question in linear programming is to certify the optimality of a given point. This is classically
done by exhibiting a feasible solution of the dual problem (i.e., a vector of Lagrange multipliers)
with the same value. There is no such a simple result in the tropical setting, because as remarked
in (Gaubert and Katz, 2009), there are (tropically linear) inequalities which can be logically deduced
from some finite system of (tropically linear) inequalities but which cannot be obtained by taking
(tropical) linear combinations of the inequalities of the system. In other words, the usual statement
of Farkas lemma is not valid in the tropical setting. However, recently Allamigeon et al. (2011b)
established a tropical analogue of Farkas lemma, building on (Akian et al., 2009), in which Lagrange
multipliers are replaced by strategies of an associated mean payoff game. We use the same idea here,
and show in Section 3.3 (Theorem 12) that the optimality of a solution can be (concisely) certified by
exhibiting a strategy of a game, having certain combinatorial properties. Similarly, whether the value
of the tropical linear-fractional programming problem is unbounded can also be certified in terms of
strategies (Theorem 13).
The second ingredient is to think of the tropical linear-fractional programming problem as a
parametric mean payoff game problem. Then, the tropical linear-fractional programming problem
reduces to the computation of theminimal parameter for which the value of the game is nonnegative.
As a function of the parameter, this value is piecewise-linear and 1-Lipschitz, see Section 3.2 for a
more detailed description.
The main contribution of this paper is a Newton-like method, where at each iteration we select
a strategy playing the role of derivative (whose existence is implied by the fact that the current
feasible point is not optimal). This defines a one player parametric game problem, and we show that
the smallest value of the parameter making the value zero can be computed in polynomial time for
this subgame, by means of shortest path algorithms as described in Section 3.5. The master algorithm
(Algorithm 2) requires solving at each iteration an auxiliary mean payoff game, see Sections 3.6 and
3.7. Mean payoff games can be solved either by value iteration, which is pseudo-polynomial, or by
policy iteration, for which exponential time instances have been recently constructed by (Friedmann,
2009), although the algorithm is fast on typical examples. The number of Newton type iterations of the
Newton-like algorithm has a trivial exponential bound (the number of strategies), and we show that
the algorithm is pseudo-polynomial, see Theorem 19. Although this algorithm seems to behave well
on typical examples, see in particular Section 4.1, some further work would be needed to assess its
worst case complexity (its behavior is likely to be similar to the one of policy iteration, see Section 4.3
for a preliminary account of numerical experiments).
1.4. Related work
Butkovič and Aminu (2008) studied the special cases (4), see also (Butkovič, 2010, Chapter 10). At
each iteration, they solve a feasibility problem (whether a tropical polyhedron is non-empty), which is
equivalent to checking whether a mean payoff game is winning for one of the players. However, their
algorithm does not involve a Newton-like iteration, but rather a dichotomy argument. In Butkovič
and Aminu (2008) the number of calls to a mean payoff oracle, whose implementation relies on the
alternating method of Cuninghame-Green and Butkovič (2003), depends on the size of the integers
in the input, whereas the number of calls in the present algorithm can be bounded independently of
these, just in terms of strategies.
A different approach to tropical linear programming was developed previously in the works of
Zimmermann (1981) and Zimmermann (2005). This approach, which is based on residuation theory,
and works over more general idempotent semirings, identifies important special cases in which the
solution can be obtained explicitly (and often, in linear time). However, it cannot be applied to our
more general formulation, in which there is little hope to find similar explicit solutions.
Newton methods for finding the least fixed point of nonlinear functions are also closely related to
this paper. Such methods were developed in Costan et al. (2005); Gaubert et al. (2007); Gawlitza and
Seidl (2007) to solve monotone fixed point problems arising in abstract interpretation. Esparza et al.
(2008) develop such methods for monotone systems of min–max-polynomial equations. They seek
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for the least fixed point of a function whose components are max-polynomials or min-polynomials,
showing that theirNewtonmethodshave linear convergence at least. The class of functions considered
there is considerably more general than the tropical linear forms appearing here, but the fixed point
problems considered in Esparza et al. (2008) appear to be of a different nature. It would be interesting,
however, to connect the two approaches.
1.5. Further motivation
Tropical polyhedra have been used in Katz (2007) to determine invariants of discrete event
systems. Systems of constraints equivalent to the ones defining tropical polyhedra have also appeared
in the analysis of delays in digital circuits, and in the study of scheduling problems with both
‘‘and’’ and ‘‘or’’ constraints (Möhring et al., 2004). Such systems have been studied by Bezem,
Nieuwenhuis, and Rodríguez-Carbonell (Bezem et al., 2008, 2010), under the name of the ‘‘max-
atom problem’’. The latter is motivated by SAT Modulo theory solving, since conjunctions of max-
atoms determine a remarkable fragment of linear arithmetic. Tropical polyhedra also turn out to
be interesting mathematical objects in their own right (Develin and Sturmfels, 2004; Joswig, 2005).
A final motivation arises from mean payoff games, the complexity of which is a well known open
problem: a series of works show that a number of problems which can be expressed in terms of
tropical polyhedra are polynomial time equivalent to mean payoff games problems (Möhring et al.,
2004; Dhingra and Gaubert, 2006; Akian et al., 2009; Bezem et al., 2010; Allamigeon et al., 2011b).
The results of the present paper rely on Akian et al. (2009); Allamigeon et al. (2011b).
2. Preliminaries
In this section,we recall somedefinitions and results needed to describe the present tropical linear-
fractional programming algorithm.
We start by introducing deterministic mean payoff games played on a finite bipartite digraph, see
Section 2.1. We then summarize some elements of the operator approach to such games, including
a theorem of Kohlberg (1980), Theorem 2, implying that their dynamic programming operators f
have invariant half-lines (χ, v). These invariant half-lines determine the ultimate growth of the orbits
f k(x)/k, known as the cycle-time vector χ(f ) of f . They also determine a pair of optimal strategies,
and the winning nodes of the players ({i | χi(f ) ≥ 0} and {i | χi(f ) < 0}) in the associated game.
Then, we recall in Section 2.2 the correspondence between tropical polyhedra and mean payoff
games, along the lines of (Akian et al., 2009): Theorem 5 shows that i is a winning node (χi(f ) ≥ 0)
if, and only if, the associated tropical two-sided system of inequalities has a solution x whose ith
coordinate is finite (xi ≠ −∞). We also recall the max-plus and min-plus representations of min–
max functions, together with the combinatorial characterization, in terms of maximal or minimal
cycle means, of the cycle time vector for one-player games. This will be used to construct optimality
and unboundedness certificates in Section 3.3.
2.1. Mean payoff games and min–max functions
Consider a two-player deterministic game where the players, called ‘‘Max’’ and ‘‘Min’’, make
alternate moves of a pawn on a weighted bipartite digraph G. The set of nodes of G is the disjoint
union of the nodes [m]where Max is active, and the nodes [n]where Min is active. When the pawn is
in node k ∈ [m] of Max, he must choose an arc in G connecting node kwith some node l ∈ [n] of Min,
and while moving the pawn along this arc, he receives the weight bkl of the selected arc as payment
from Min. When the pawn is in node j ∈ [n] of Min, she must choose an arc in G connecting node j
with some node i ∈ [m] of Max, and pays−aij to Max, where−aij is the weight of the selected arc. We
assume that bkl, aij ∈ R. Moreover, certain movesmay be prohibited, meaning that the corresponding
arcs are not present in G. Then, we set bkl = −∞ and aij = −∞. Thus, the whole game is equivalently
defined by two m × n matrices A = (aij) and B = (bkl) with entries in R ∪ {−∞}. We make the
following assumptions, which assure that both players have at least one move allowed in each node.
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Assumption 1. For all k ∈ [m] there exists l ∈ [n] such that bkl ≠ −∞.
Assumption 2. For all j ∈ [n] there exists i ∈ [m] such that aij ≠ −∞.
A general strategy for a player (Max or Min) is a function that for every finite history of a play
ending at some node selects a successor of this node (i.e., a move of the player). A positional strategy
for a player is a function that selects a unique successor of every node independently of the history of
the play.
A strategy for player Max will be usually denoted by σ and a strategy for player Min by τ . Thus, a
positional strategy for player Max is a function σ : [m] → [n] such that biσ(i) is finite for all i ∈ [m],
and a positional strategy for player Min is a function τ : [n] → [m] such that aτ(j)j is finite for all
j ∈ [n].
When player Max reveals his positional strategy σ , the play proceeds within the digraph Gσ where
at each node i of Max all but one arc (i, σ (i)) are removed. When player Min reveals her positional
strategy τ , the play proceedswithin the digraphGτ where at each node j ofMin all but one arc (j, τ (j))
are removed.
When player Max reveals his positional strategy σ and player Min her positional strategy τ , the
play proceeds within the digraph Gσ ,τ where each node has a unique outgoing arc (i, σ (i)) or (j, τ (j)).
Thus, Gσ ,τ is a ‘‘sunflower’’ digraph, i.e., such that each node has a unique path to a unique cycle.
The infinite horizon version of this mean payoff game starts at a node j of Min2 and proceeds
according to the strategies (not necessarily positional) of the players, who are interested in the value
of average payment. More precisely, player Min wants to minimize
Φ
sup
A,B (j, τ , σ ) := lim sup
k→∞

k
t=1
−ait jt−1 + bit jt

/k, j0 = j,
while player Max wants to maximize
Φ infA,B(j, τ , σ ) := lim infk→∞

k
t=1
−ait jt−1 + bit jt

/k, j0 = j,
where j1 ∈ [n], i1 ∈ [m], j2 ∈ [n], i2 ∈ [m], . . . is the infinite sequence of positions of the pawn
resulting from the selected strategies τ and σ of the players. The next theorem shows that this game
has a value. An analogue of this theorem concerning stochastic games was obtained by Liggett and
Lippman (1969).
Theorem 1 (Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski (1979); Gurvich et al. (1988)). For the mean payoff game whose
payments are given by the matrices A, B ∈ (R∪{−∞})m×n, where A, B satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, there
exists a vector χ ∈ Rn and a pair of positional strategies σ ∗ and τ ∗ such that
(i) ΦsupA,B (j, τ
∗, σ ) ≤ χj for all (not necessarily positional) strategies σ ,
(ii) Φ infA,B(j, τ , σ
∗) ≥ χj for all (not necessarily positional) strategies τ ,
for all nodes j ofMin.
In other words, player Max has a positional strategy σ ∗ which secures a mean profit of at least χj
whatever is the strategy of player Min, and player Min has a positional strategy τ ∗ which secures a
mean loss of no more than χj whatever player Max does.
A finite duration version of themean payoff game considered above can be also formulated. Again, it
starts at a certain node j ofMin and proceeds according to the strategies of the players (not necessarily
positional), but stops immediately when a cycle j0 ∈ [m] → i1 ∈ [n] → j1 ∈ [m] → · · · → ik ∈
2 The game can start also at a node i of Max, the requirement to be started by Min is for better consistency with min–max
functions and two-sided tropical systems, see (7) and (14).
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[n] → jk = j0 is formed. Then, the outcome of the game is the mean weight per turn (so the length of
a cycle may be seen as the number of nodes of Max or Min it contains) of that cycle:
ΦA,B(j, τ , σ ) :=

k
t=1
−ait jt−1 + bit jt

/k. (5)
The ambition of Max is to maximizeΦA,B(j, τ , σ )while Min is seeking to minimize it.
It was shown in Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski (1979, Theorem 2) that this finite duration version
of the game has the same value as the infinite horizon version described above, and that there are
positional optimal strategies which secure this value for both versions of the game. It follows by
standard arguments that χj is determined uniquely by
χj = ΦA,B(j, τ ∗, σ ∗) = min
τ
max
σ
ΦA,B(j, τ , σ ) = max
σ
min
τ
ΦA,B(j, τ , σ ), (6)
where τ and σ range over the sets of all strategies (not necessarily positional) for players Min and
Max, respectively.
The dynamic programming operator f : Rn → Rn associatedwith the infinite horizonmean payoff
game is defined by:
fj(x) =

k∈[m]

−akj +

l∈[n]
(bkl + xl)

. (7)
This function, combining min-plus and max-plus linearity (see below in Section 2.2), is known as a
min–max function (Cochet-Terrasson et al., 1999). Min-max functions are isotone (x ≤ y ⇒ f (x) ≤
f (y)) and additively homogeneous (f (λ + x) = λ + f (x)). Hence, they are nonexpansive in the sup-
norm. Moreover, they are piecewise affine (Rn can be covered by a finite number of polyhedra on
which f is affine). We are interested in the following limit (cycle-time vector):
χ(f ) = lim
k→∞ f
k(x)/k. (8)
The jth entry of the vector χ(f ) can be interpreted as the limit of themean value of the game per turn,
as the horizon k tends to infinity, when the starting node is j. The existence of χ(f ) follows from a
theorem of Kohlberg.
Theorem 2 (Kohlberg (1980)). Let f : Rn → Rn be a nonexpansive and piecewise affine function. Then,
there exist v ∈ Rn and χ ∈ Rn such that
f (v + tχ) = v + (t + 1)χ, ∀t ≥ T ,
where T is a large enough real number.
The function t → v + tχ is known as an invariant half-line. Using the nonexpansiveness of f , one
deduces that the limit (8) exists, is the same for all x ∈ Rn and is equal to the growth rate χ of any
invariant half-line.
Given fixed positional strategies τ and σ for players Min and Max, respectively, we can consider
the dynamic operators corresponding to the partial digraphsGτ andGσ . These operators aremax-only
and min-only functions:
f τj (x) = −aτ(j)j +

l∈[n]
(bτ(j)l + xl),
f σj (x) =

i∈[m]
(−aij + biσ(i) + xσ(i)). (9)
They are the main subject of tropical linear algebra, see Section 2.2, where in particular we recall how
their cycle-time vectors can be computed. Eq. (10) relates these cycle-time vectors with the cycle time
vector of the min–max function (7).
The following result can be derived as a standard corollary of Kohlberg’s theorem. Indeed,wedefine
a positional strategy τ of Min and a positional strategy σ of Max by the condition that f (v + tχ) =
f σ (v + tχ) = f τ (v + tχ) for t large enough, where t → v + tχ is an invariant half-line. These
strategies are easily seen to be optimal for the mean payoff game.
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Theorem 3 (Corollary of Kohlberg (1980)). For f (x) given by (7), the jth coordinate of χ(f ) is the value
of the mean payoff game which starts at node j ofMin.
Inwhat follows, we shall use the following form of the value existence result (6), whichwas proved
in (Gaubert and Gunawardena, 1998) as a corollary of the termination of the policy iteration algorithm
of (Gaubert and Gunawardena, 1998; Cochet-Terrasson et al., 1999), see (Dhingra and Gaubert, 2006)
for a more recent presentation. Alternatively, it can be quickly derived from Kohlberg (1980) (the
derivation can be found in (Akian et al., 2009, Theorem 2.13)). This result has been known as the
‘‘duality theorem’’ in the discrete event systems literature.
Theorem 4 (Coro. of Kohlberg (1980), Gaubert and Gunawardena (1998)). Let A, B ∈ (R ∪ {−∞})m×n
satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, and let S and T be the sets of all positional strategies for playersMax andMin,
respectively. Then,
max
σ∈S
χ(f σ ) = χ(f ) = min
τ∈T χ(f
τ ). (10)
This characterization of χ(f ) should be compared with (6). The latter shows that the infinite
horizon version of the game with limsup/liminf payoff has a value, whereas (10) concerns the limit
of the value of the finite horizon version. Thus, in loose terms, the ‘‘limit’’ and ‘‘value’’ operations
commute.
2.2. Tropical linear systems and mean payoff games
Max-only and min-only functions of the form (9) belong to tropical linear algebra. Max-only
functions are linear in the max-plus semiring Rmax, which is the set R ∪ {−∞} equipped with the
operations of ‘‘addition’’ ‘‘a+ b’’ := a∨ b and ‘‘multiplication’’ ‘‘ab’’ := a+ b. For min-only functions,
we use themin-plus semiring Rmin, i.e., the set R ∪ {+∞} equipped with the operations of ‘‘addition’’
‘‘a + b’’ := a ∧ b and the same ‘‘additive’’ multiplication. The setting in which both structures are
considered simultaneously has been called minimax algebra in (Cuninghame-Green, 1979). Then, we
need to allow the scalars to belong to the enlarged set R := R ∪ {−∞} ∪ {+∞}. Note that in R,
(−∞) + (+∞) = −∞ if the max-plus convention is considered and (−∞) + (+∞) = +∞ if the
min-plus convention is considered.
The tropical operations are extended to matrices and vectors in the usual way. In particular, for
any matrix E = (eij) and any vector x of compatible dimensions:
‘‘(Ex)i’’ =

j
eij + xj (max-plus), ‘‘(Ex)i’’ =

j
eij + xj (min-plus). (11)
Max-plus and min-plus linear functions are mutually adjoint, or residuated. Recall that for a max-plus
linear function from Rn to Rm, given by E ∈ Rm×nmax , the residuated operator E♯ from Rm to Rn is defined
by
(E♯y)j :=

i∈[m]
(−eij + yi), (12)
with the convention (−∞) + (+∞) = +∞. Note that this residuated operator, also known as
Cuninghame-Green inverse, is given by the multiplication of −ET by y with the min-plus operations
(here ET denotes the transposed of E), and that it sends Rmmax to R
n
max whenever E does not have
columns identically equal to−∞.
Inwhat follows, concatenations such as Ex should be understood as themultiplication of E by xwith
the max-plus operations, and concatenations such as E♯y should be understood as the multiplication
of−ET by ywith the min-plus operations (and the corresponding conventions for (−∞)+ (+∞)).
The term ‘‘residuated’’ refers to the property
Ex ≤ y ⇔ x ≤ E♯y, (13)
where≤ is the partial order on Rmmax or Rnmax, which can be deduced from
eij + xj ≤ yi ∀i, j ⇔ xj ≤ −eij + yi ∀i, j.
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As a consequence, the residuated operator is crucial for max-plus two-sided systems of inequalities,
because (13) implies:
Ax ≤ Bx ⇔ x ≤ A♯Bx. (14)
Writing the last inequality explicitly, we have
xj ≤

k∈[m]

−akj +

l∈[n]
(bkl + xl)

, ∀j ∈ [n]. (15)
Thus, we obtain the same min–max function as in (7).
Moreover, positional strategies σ : [m] → [n] and τ : [n] → [m] correspond to affine functions Bσ
and Aτ defined by
(Aτ )ij =

aij if i = τ(j),
−∞ otherwise, (B
σ )ij =

bij if j = σ(i),
−∞ otherwise. (16)
Recasting (10) in max(min)-plus algebra, we obtain
max
σ∈S
χ(A♯Bσ ) = χ(A♯B) = min
τ∈T χ(A
♯
τB). (17)
The following result, obtained by Akian, Gaubert and Guterman, relates solutions of Ax ≤ Bx and
nonnegative coordinates ofχ(A♯B). These coordinates correspond towinning nodes of themean payoff
game: if the game starts in these nodes, then Max can ensure nonnegative profit with any strategy of
Min.
Theorem 5 (Akian et al., 2009, Theorem 3.2). Let A, B ∈ Rm×nmax satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. Then,
χi(A♯B) ≥ 0 if and only if there exists x ∈ Rnmax such that Ax ≤ Bx and xi ≠ −∞.
This is derived in Akian et al. (2009) fromKohlberg’s theorem. The vector x is constructed by taking
an invariant half-line, t → v + tχ , setting xi = vi + tχi for t large enough if χi ≥ 0, and xi = −∞
otherwise.
Theorem 5 shows that to decide whether Ax ≤ Bx can be satisfied by a vector x such that xi ≠ −∞,
we can exploit amean payoff oracle, which decides whether i is a winning node of the associatedmean
payoff game and gives a winning strategy for player Max. This oracle can be implemented either by
using the value iteration method, which is pseudo-polynomial (Zwick and Paterson, 1996), by the
approach of Puri (solving an associated discounted game for a discount factor close enough to 1 by
policy iteration (Puri, 1995)), by using the policy iteration algorithm formean payoff games of Cochet-
Terrasson et al. (1999); Gaubert and Gunawardena (1998); Dhingra and Gaubert (2006), or the one
of Bjorklund and Vorobyov (2007).
In tropical linear algebra, there is no obvious subtraction. However, for any E ∈ Rn×n we can define
the Kleene star
E∗ := ‘‘(I − E)−1’’ = I ∨ E ∨ E2 ∨ · · · (max-plus), (18)
and analogously with ∧ in the min-plus case. In (18), I is the max-plus identity matrix with 0 entries
on the main diagonal and−∞ off the diagonal, and the powers are understood in the tropical (max-
plus) sense. Due to the order completeness ofR, the series in (18) is well-defined for all matrices. Note
that in Rn×n, X = E∗ is a solution of the matrix Bellman equation X = EX ∨ I . Similarly, x = E∗h is a
solution of x = Ex ∨ h. Indeed, if z ≥ Ez ∨ h, then we also have
z ≥ Ez ∨ h ≥ E2z ∨ Eh ∨ h ≥ · · · ≥ Ek+1z ∨ Ekh ∨ Ek−1h ∨ · · · ∨ h,
so that z ≥ E∗h for all such z. We sum this up in the following standard proposition.
Proposition 6 (See e.g. (Baccelli et al., 1992, Theorem 3.17)). Let E ∈ Rn×n and h ∈ Rn. Then, E∗h is the
least solution of z ≥ Ez ∨ h.
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For E ∈ Rn×n, consider the associated digraph D(E), with set of nodes [n] and an arc connecting
node i with node j whenever eij is finite, in which case eij is the weight of this arc. We shall say that
node i accesses node j if there exists a path from i to j inD(E).
The maximal (minimal) cycle mean is another important object of tropical algebra. For E ∈ Rn×nmax
(E ∈ Rn×nmin ), it is defined as
µmax(E) = max
k∈[n]
max
i1,...,ik
ei1 i2 + · · · + eiki1
k
(max-plus),
µmin(E) = min
k∈[n] mini1,...,ik
ei1 i2 + · · · + eiki1
k
(min-plus).
(19)
Denote byµmaxi (E) (µ
min
i (E)) themaximal (minimal) cyclemean of the strongly connected component
of D(E) to which i belongs. These numbers are given by the same expressions as in (19), but with
i1, . . . , ik restricted to that strongly connected component. Using µmaxi (E) (µ
min
i (E)), we can write
explicit expressions for the cycle-time vector of a max-plus (min-plus) linear function x → Ex:
χmaxi (E) = max{µmaxj (E) | i accesses j} (max-plus),
χmini (E) = min{µminj (E) | i accesses j} (min-plus). (20)
See (Cochet-Terrasson et al., 1998) or (Heidergott et al., 2005) for proofs. Importantly, these cycle-time
vectors of max-plus and min-plus linear functions appear in (10).
Finally, note that (19) and (20) can be deduced from (6) if σ or τ is fixed.
Remark 1. Observe that any entry (i, j) of Ek in max-plus (resp. min-plus) algebra expresses the
maximal (resp. minimal) weight of paths with k arcs connecting node iwith node j inD(E). It follows
then from (18) that any entry (i, j) of E∗, for i ≠ j, expresses themaximal (or minimal) weight of paths
connecting node iwith node jwithout restrictions on the number of arcs. Further we can add toD(E)
a new node and, whenever bi is finite, an arc of weight bi connecting node i of D(E) with this new
node. Then, (E∗b)i provides themaximal (orminimal) weight of paths connecting node iwith the new
node. Therefore, computing E∗b is equivalent to solving a single destination shortest path problem,
which can be done in O(n3) time (for instance by the Bellman-Ford algorithm).
Remark 2. We note that χmax(E) and χmin(E) can also be computed in O(n3) time. To do this,
decompose first the digraph D(E) in strongly connected components, and apply Karp’s algorithm
to compute the maximal or minimal cycle mean of each component.
3. Tropical linear-fractional programming
This is the main section of the paper. Here we solve the tropical linear-fractional programming
problem (3), i.e., the problem
minimize (px ∨ r)− (qx ∨ s)
subject to: Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d, x ∈ Rnmax (21)
where p, q ∈ Rnmax, c, d ∈ Rmmax, r, s ∈ Rmax and A, B ∈ Rm×nmax .
In Section 3.1, we apply Theorem 5 to reduce (21) to the problem of finding the smallest zero of a
function giving the value of a parametric game (the spectral function).
In Section 3.2, we show that the spectral function is 1-Lipschitz and piecewise linear, and that it
can be written as a finite supremum or infimum of partial spectral functions, corresponding to one-
player games. We also prove a number of technical statements about the piecewise-linear structure
of the spectral functions, which will be used in the complexity analysis.
In Section 3.3,weprovide certificates of optimality andunboundedness (these certificates are given
by strategies for the players). This generalizes the result of (Allamigeon et al., 2011b), concerning
the tropical analogue of Farkas lemma. We recover as a special case the unboundedness certificates
of (Butkovič and Aminu, 2008).
The rest of the section is devoted to finding the least zero of the spectral function.With this aim,we
introduce a bisection method, as well as a Newton-type method, in which partial spectral functions
play the role of derivatives, see Section 3.4.
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Each Newton iteration consists of
(i) Computing a derivative, i.e., choosing a strategy for player Max (or dually Min) which satisfies a
local optimality condition;
(ii) Finding the smallest zero of the tangent map, which represents the parametric spectral function
of a one-player game in which the strategy for player Max (or dually Min) is already fixed.
The iteration in the space of strategies for player Max has an advantage: the second subproblem can
be reduced to a shortest-path problem (Section 3.5). The first subproblem is discussed in Section 3.6,
where the overall worst-case complexity of the Newton method is given. Section 3.7, which can be
skipped by the reader, gives an alternative approach to the first subproblem inwhich the computation
of (left) optimal strategies is rather algebraic and not relying on the integrality.
3.1. The spectral function method
In this subsection we recast (21) as a parametric two-sided tropical system and a mean payoff
game, introducing the key concept of spectral function. However, before doing this we need to
mention special cases in which there exists a feasible x (i.e., satisfying Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d) such that
px ∨ r = −∞ or qx ∨ s = −∞. For these cases we assume the following rules:
px ∨ r qx ∨ s (px ∨ r)− (qx ∨ s)
−∞ finite −∞
finite −∞ +∞
−∞ −∞ −∞
(22)
which are formally consistent with the rules of Rmax. Then, it is easy to check that
(px ∨ r)− (qx ∨ s) = min{λ ∈ Rmax | px ∨ r ≤ λ+ (qx ∨ s)}. (23)
Introducing the notation
U =

A c
p r

and V (λ) =

B d
λ+ q λ+ s

, (24)
we reformulate the tropical linear-fractional programming problem in terms of a spectral function,
which gives the value of a parametric mean payoff game: the payments are given by the matrices U
and V (λ), and the initial node is n+ 1.
Proposition-Definition 7. With assumption (22), the tropical linear-fractional programming prob-
lem (21) is equivalent to
min{λ ∈ Rmax | φ(λ) ≥ 0} (25)
where the spectral function φ is given by
φ(λ) := χn+1(U♯V (λ)) .
Proof. We first show that (21) is equivalent to the following problem:
minimize λ
subject to: px ∨ r ≤ λ+ (qx ∨ s), Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d, x ∈ Rnmax, λ ∈ Rmax (26)
Indeed, denoting P = x ∈ Rnmax | Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d, we verify that
min
x∈P {(px ∨ r)− (qx ∨ s)} = minx∈P minλ {λ | px ∨ r ≤ λ+ (qx ∨ s)}
= min
λ
{∃x ∈ P | px ∨ r ≤ λ+ (qx ∨ s)} .
Every problem concerning affine polyhedra has an equivalent ‘‘homogeneous’’ version concerning
cones, which is obtained by adding to the system of inequalities defining an affine polyhedron a
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new variable whose coefficients are the free terms of this system. Then, the original polyhedron is
recovered by setting this new variable to 0. The homogeneous equivalent version of (26) reads:
minimize λ
subject to: uy ≤ λ+ vy, Cy ≤ Dy, yn+1 ≠ −∞, y ∈ Rn+1max, λ ∈ Rmax (27)
where we set u = [p, r], v = [q, s], C = [A, c] and D = [B, d].
We can still reformulate (27) in a more compact way:
min{λ ∈ Rmax | Uy ≤ V (λ)y , yn+1 ≠ −∞ is solvable} ,
with U and V (λ) defined in (24). Finally, by Theorem 5, it follows that Uy ≤ V (λ)y is solvable with
finite yn+1 if, and only if, χn+1(U♯V (λ)) ≥ 0. 
Remark 3. Butkovič and Aminu (2008) considered the following special cases of (21):
minimize px (resp. maximize qx)
subject to: Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d, x ∈ Rn (28)
where p, q ∈ Rn, c, d ∈ Rm, r, s ∈ R and A, B ∈ Rm×n have only finite entries. Clearly, (21)
becomes (28) if we set r = −∞, q ≡ −∞ and s = 0 for minimization, or respectively s = −∞,
p ≡ −∞ and r = 0 for maximization, where the opposite (tropical inverse) of the minimal value of
λ equals the maximum of qx.
In this connection, formulation (27) (or equivalently (21)) has a good geometric insight, meaning
optimization for general tropical half-spaces (or hyperplanes) defined by bivectors (u, λ + v),
see (Gaubert and Katz, 2009; Allamigeon et al., 2011b) for more background.
Example 1. Assume we want to maximize (1 + x1) ∨ (3 + x2) over the tropical polyhedron of R2max
defined by the system Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d, where
A =
 −∞ −1−2 −2−1 −∞
0 −∞
 , c =
 −∞−∞−∞
−∞
 , B =
 0 −∞−∞ −∞−∞ 0
−∞ 2
 , d =
 000
0
 .
This tropical polyhedron is displayed on the left-hand side of Fig. 6 below. Thismaximization problem
is equivalent to minimizing λ subject to 0 ≤ λ+ ((1+ x1) ∨ (3+ x2)), Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d. Indeed, the
value of the latter problem is the opposite (tropical inverse) of the value of themaximization problem.
The homogeneous version of this minimization problem reads:
minimize λ
subject to: uy ≤ λ+ vy, Cy ≤ Dy, y3 ≠ −∞, y ∈ R3max, λ ∈ Rmax (29)
where C = [A, c], D = [B, d], u = (−∞,−∞, 0), and v = (1, 3,−∞).
3.2. Partial spectral functions and piecewise linearity
Wehave shown that solving the tropical linear-fractional programming problem (21) is equivalent
to finding the least zero of the spectral functionφ(λ) := χn+1(U♯V (λ)). Herewewill analyze the graph
of this spectral function, after introducing analogues of derivatives, the partial spectral functions.
Given a strategy σ ∈ S for player Max and a strategy τ ∈ T for player Min, we respectively define
the min-plus linear function U♯V σ (λ) and the max-plus linear function U♯τV (λ), see (9) and (16). We
introduce the partial spectral functions φσ (λ) := χn+1(U♯V σ (λ)) and φτ (λ) := χn+1(U♯τV (λ)). With
this notation, (17) yields
φ(λ) = max
σ∈S
φσ (λ) = min
τ∈T φτ (λ). (30)
Partial spectral functions can be represented as in (6),where one of the strategies is fixed, see also (20):
φσ (λ) = min
τ∈T ΦU,V (λ)(n+ 1, τ , σ ), φτ (λ) = maxσ∈S ΦU,V (λ)(n+ 1, τ , σ ). (31)
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Fig. 2. A partial spectral function (left) and a spectral function (right).
Fig. 3. The bipartite digraphGλ of themean payoff game associatedwith the tropical linear programming problemof Example 2.
Special nodes n+1 andm+1 are in bold aswell as a strategy τ for playerMin certifying the optimality ofλ∗ = 0. The subdigraph
Gτλ∗ is obtained by deleting the dashed arcs.
Fig. 4.On the left: the bipartite digraph of themean payoff game associatedwith the tropical linear programming problem (26).
The nodes of Max are represented by squares and the nodes of Min by circles. In the middle and on the right: the bipartite
digraphs of the special cases (28), for the minimization problem and the maximization problem, respectively.
A graphical presentation of (31) and (30) using only φτ is given in Fig. 2.
LetGλ be the bipartite digraph of themean payoff gamewhose payments are given by thematrices
U and V (λ), see Figs. 3 and 4 for illustrations. Observe that in this digraph, only the weight of the arcs
connecting nodem+1 ofMaxwith nodes l ∈ [n+1] ofMin depend on λ. Recall that given a strategy σ
for player Max (resp. τ for player Min), Gσλ (resp. G
τ
λ) denotes the bipartite subdigraph of Gλ obtained
by deleting from Gλ all the arcs (i, j) such that i ∈ [m+ 1] and j ≠ σ(i) (resp. the arcs (j, i) such that
j ∈ [n+ 1] and i ≠ τ(j)).
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We next investigate the properties of spectral functions.
Theorem 8. Let σ : [m+1] → [n+1] be a positional strategy for playerMax and τ : [n+1] → [m+1]
be a positional strategy for playerMin. Then,
(i) φ(λ), φτ (λ) and φσ (λ) are 1-Lipschitz nondecreasing piecewise-linear functions, whose linear pieces
are of the form (α + βλ)/k, where k ∈ [min(m, n)+ 1] and β ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) If the absolute values of all the finite coefficients in (27) are bounded by M, then |α/k| ≤ 2M.
(iii) φτ (λ) is convex and φσ (λ) is concave. Both functions consist of no more than min(m, n) + 2 linear
pieces.
Proof. As follows from (30) and (31), spectral functions are built from the finite number of functions
λ → ΦU,V (λ)(n+ 1, σ , τ ), each of which is given by the mean weight per turn of the only elementary
cycle in Gσ ,τλ accessible from node n + 1 of Min. Recall that Gσ ,τλ is the subdigraph of Gλ where all
arcs at all nodes except for those chosen by player Max (strategy σ ) and player Min (strategy τ ) are
removed. As a function of λ, this mean weight per turn is a line (α+βλ)/k. Here k ∈ [min(m, n)+ 1]
since the length (i.e., the number of nodes of Max it contains) of any elementary cycle in the bipartite
digraph Gλ does not exceed both m + 1 and n + 1. Also β ∈ {0, 1}, because an elementary cycle can
contain nodem+ 1 of Max no more than once. If the absolute values of all the payments in the game
are bounded by M , then |α/k| ≤ 2M since the arithmetic mean of payments, counted per turn, does
not exceed the greatest sum of two consecutive payments.
Thus, the functions λ → ΦU,V (λ)(n + 1, σ , τ ) satisfy all the properties of (i) and (ii). Using (30)
and (31) we conclude that φ(λ), φτ (λ) and φσ (λ) also satisfy these properties.
Convexity (resp. concavity) of φτ (resp. φσ ) follows from (31). In a convex or concave
piecewise-linear function, each slope can appear only once, while the possible slopes are 0, 1,
1/2, . . . , 1/(min(m, n)+ 1). This shows (iii). 
Some useful facts can be deduced further from this description of spectral functions.
Corollary 9. Spectral functions satisfy the following properties:
(i) If the absolute values of all coefficients in (27) are either infinite or bounded by M, then φ(λ), φσ (λ)
and φτ (λ) are linear for λ ≤ −4M(min(m, n)+ 1)2 and for λ ≥ 4M(min(m, n)+ 1)2.
(ii) If the absolute values of all coefficients in (27) are either infinite or bounded by M, then the solutions
to the problems min{λ | φ(λ) ≥ 0}, min{λ | φσ (λ) ≥ 0} and min{λ | φτ (λ) ≥ 0} lie (if finite) in
[−2M(min(m, n)+1), 2M(min(m, n)+1)]. Moreover, if all the finite coefficients are integers, then
the solutions to all these problems are integers as well.
(iii) If the finite coefficients in (27) are integers, then the breaking points of φ(λ), φσ (λ) or φτ (λ) are
rational numbers whose denominators do not exceedmin(m, n)+ 1.
(iv) If the finite coefficients in (27) are integers with absolute values bounded by M, then φ(λ) consists of
no more than 8M(min(m, n)+ 1)4 + 2 linear pieces.
Proof. (i) Consider the intersection point µ of one linear piece (α1 + β1λ)/k1 with another linear
piece (α2+β2λ)/k2. By Theorem 8, k1, k2 ≤ min(m, n)+1 and |α1/k1|, |α2/k2| ≤ 2M , and we obtain
from
|β1/k1 − β2/k2| ≥ 1
(min(m, n)+ 1)2 , |α1/k1 − α2/k2| ≤ 4M,
that |µ| ≤ 4M(min(m, n) + 1)2. This means that φ(λ) is linear for λ ≥ 4M(min(m, n) + 1)2 and
λ ≤ −4M(min(m, n)+ 1)2. (Note that this part did not impose the integrality of coefficients.)
(ii) Note that due to piecewise-linearity, the solution to each of these problems (if finite) is given
by the intersection point of a certain linear piece of the form (α + λ)/k with zero. Then, since
|α/k| ≤ 2M and k ≤ min(m, n)+ 1 by Theorem 8, we conclude that this intersection point−α lies in
[−2M(min(m, n) + 1), 2M(min(m, n) + 1)]. Moreover, if the finite coefficients in (27) are integers,
then this solution−α is also integer.
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(iii) By Theorem 8, spectral functions are piecewise linear and the linear pieces are of the form
(α + βλ)/k, where in particular k ∈ [min(m, n) + 1] and β ∈ {0, 1}. Considering the intersection
pointµ of one such piece (α1+β1λ)/k1 with another piece (α2+β2λ)/k2 and assuming the integrity
of α1, α2 we obtain thatµ = (k1α2−k2α1)/(k2β1−k1β2) is a rational number with denominator not
exceeding min(m, n)+ 1.
(iv) The denominators of breaking points do not exceed min(m, n) + 1, and hence the difference
between their inverses is not less than 1/(min(m, n) + 1)2. This is a lower bound for the difference
between two consecutive breaking points. We get the claim applying part (i). 
Note that to determine the slope of φ(λ) at+∞, meaning for λ ≥ 4M(min(m, n)+1)2, or at−∞,
meaning for λ ≤ −4M(min(m, n) + 1)2, we can set all the finite coefficients in (27) to 0. Then, we
‘‘play’’ the mean payoff game at λ = 1 or at λ = −1, respectively.
Denote by MPGI(m, n,M) the worst-case complexity of an oracle computing the value of mean
payoff games with integer payments whose absolute values are bounded byM , withm nodes of Max
and n nodes of Min. There exist pseudo-polynomial algorithms computing the value of mean payoff
games. For instance, in (Zwick and Paterson, 1996) the authors describe a value iteration algorithm
withO(mn4M) complexity. Using this we now show that all the linear pieces of a spectral function can
be identified in pseudo-polynomial time. Note that we do not require the oracle to compute optimal
strategies here.
Proposition 10. Let all the finite coefficients in (27) be integer with absolute values not exceeding M.
Then, all the linear pieces that constitute the graph of φ(λ) can be identified in
O(M min(m, n)4)×MPGI(m+ 1, n+ 1,M(min(m, n)+ 1)(1+ 4(min(m, n)+ 1)2))
operations.
Proof. By Corollary 9 part (iii), the breaking points of φ(λ) are rational numbers whose denominators
do not exceed min(m, n) + 1. To identify the linear pieces that constitute the graph of the spectral
function, we only need to evaluate φ(λ) on such rational points in the interval [−4M(min(m, n) +
1)2, 4M(min(m, n)+ 1)2], the number of which does not exceed O(M min(m, n)4).
Further, when computing φ(λ), the payments in the mean payoff games that the oracle works
with are either a or a + λ, where a is an integer satisfying |a| ≤ M and λ is a rational number in
[−4M(min(m, n)+1)2, 4M(min(m, n)+1)2]whose denominator does not exceedmin(m, n)+1. The
properties of the gamewill not change if wemultiply all the payments by this denominator, obtaining
a new game in which the payments are integers with absolute values bounded by (min(m, n) +
1)(M + 4M(min(m, n) + 1)2). Then, the complexity of the mean payoff oracle will not exceed
MPGI(m + 1, n + 1, (min(m, n) + 1)(M + 4M(min(m, n) + 1)2)). Multiplying by O(M min(m, n)4)
we get the claim. 
Remark 4. It follows that the tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27) can be solved in
pseudo-polynomial time by reconstructing all the linear pieces that constitute the graph of φ(λ).
However, more efficient methods will be described in Section 3.4.
Remark 5. A similar spectral function has been introduced in (Gaubert and Sergeev, 2010) to compute
the set of solutions λ of the two-sided eigenproblem Ax = λBx. The present approach can be extended
to a larger class of parametric games, in which the payments are piecewise affine functions of the
parameter λ, with integer slopes. See (Sergeev, 2010).
3.3. Strategies as certificates
In the classical simplex method, the optimality of a feasible solution is certified by the sign of
Lagrange multipliers. In the tropical case, following the idea of (Allamigeon et al., 2011b), we shall
show that the certificate is of a different nature: it is a strategy. We shall also use such strategies to
guide the next iteration of the Newton method in Section 3.4, when the current feasible solution is
not optimal.
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Definition 11 (Left and Right Optimal Strategies). A strategy σ− for player Max (resp. τ− for player
Min) is left optimal at λ ∈ R, if there exists ϵ > 0 such that
φ(µ) = φσ−(µ) (resp. φ(µ) = φτ−(µ)) ∀µ ∈ [λ− ϵ, λ].
Right optimal strategies σ+ and τ+ are defined in a similar way, replacing [λ− ϵ, λ] by [λ, λ+ ϵ].
The existence of left and right optimal strategies at each point follows readily from (30), together
with the finiteness of the number of strategies and the piecewise affine character of each function
φσ (λ) and φτ (λ).
Theorem 12. The tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27) has the optimal value λ∗ ∈ R if,
and only if, φ(λ∗) ≥ 0 and there exists a strategy τ for playerMin such that the digraph Gτλ∗ satisfies the
following conditions:
(i) all cycles accessible from node n+ 1 ofMin have nonpositive weight,
(ii) any cycle of zero weight accessible from node n+ 1 ofMin passes through node m+ 1 ofMax.
Moreover, these conditions are always satisfied when τ is left optimal at λ∗.
Proof. The tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27) has the optimal value λ∗ if, and only
if, φ(λ∗) = 0 and φ(λ) < 0 for all λ < λ∗. If τ is any left optimal strategy at λ∗, then the previous
conditions are satisfied if, and only if, φτ (λ∗) = 0 and φτ (λ) has nonzero left derivative at λ∗.
By (31), or (19) and (20), we know that φτ (λ) is the maximal cycle mean (per turn) over all cycles
in Gτλ accessible from node n + 1 of Min. It follows that φτ (λ∗) = 0 if, and only if, all cycles in Gτλ∗
accessible from node n+ 1 of Min have nonpositive weight and at least one of them has zero weight.
Moreover,φτ (λ)has nonzero left derivative atλ∗ if, and only if, any zero-weight cycle inGτλ∗ accessible
fromnode n+1 ofMin has arcswithweights depending onλ, which can only occur if it passes through
node m + 1 of Max. Thus, the conditions of the theorem are necessary and they are satisfied by any
left optimal strategy τ at λ∗.
Assume now that there exists a strategy τ satisfying the conditions of the theorem. Then, the
argument above shows that φτ (λ∗) ≤ 0 and φτ (λ) < 0 for all λ < λ∗. Since φ(λ∗) ≥ 0 and by (30)
we have φ(λ) ≤ φτ (λ) for all λ, it follows that φ(λ∗) = 0 and φ(λ) < 0 for all λ < λ∗. Therefore, λ∗
is the optimal value of the tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27). 
In the same way, we can certify when the tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27) is
unbounded.
Theorem 13. The tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27) is unbounded if, and only if, there
exists a strategy σ for playerMax such that all cycles in the digraph Gσ0 accessible from node n+ 1 ofMin
do not contain node m+ 1 ofMax and have nonnegative weight.
Proof. We know that the tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27) is unbounded if, and
only if, φ(λ) ≥ 0 for all λ. By the first equality in (30), the latter condition is satisfied if, and only if,
there exists a strategy σ for player Max such that φσ (λ) ≥ 0 for all λ. Note that the weight of a cycle
in Gσλ that passes through nodem+ 1 of Max can be made arbitrarily small by decreasing λ, because
this cycle must contain an arc whose weight depends on λ. Therefore, using the fact that φσ (λ) is the
minimal cyclemean (per turn) over all cycles inGσλ accessible from node n+1 ofMin (see (31), or (19)
and (20)), it follows that φσ (λ) ≥ 0 for all λ if, and only if, all cycles in Gσ0 accessible from node n+ 1
of Min have nonnegative weight and do not pass through nodem+ 1 of Max. 
Remark 6. Theorems 12 and 13 are inspired by Theorem 18 and Corollary 20 of (Allamigeon et al.,
2011b), in which similar certificates are given for the problem of checking whether an implication of
the form Ax ≤ Bx =⇒ px ≤ qx holds. The latter can be cast as a special tropical linear-fractional
programming problem.
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Fig. 5. The minimization problem of Example 2: the tropical polyhedron and the spectral function.
Example 2. Consider the tropical linear programming problemgiven by theminimization of (2+x1)∨
(−4+ x2) over the tropical polyhedron of R2max defined by the system of inequalities Ax∨ c ≤ Bx∨ d,
where
A =

−∞ −∞
−∞ −∞
−∞ −∞
−∞ −3
−∞ −4
−∞ −5
−∞ −6
 , c =

0
0
0
0
−∞
−∞
−∞
 , B =

−2 0
0 −1
1 −2
2 −∞
0 −∞
−2 −∞
−4 −∞
 , d =

−∞
−∞
−∞
−∞
0
0
0
 .
This polyhedron is displayed on the left-hand side of Fig. 5. The direction of minimization of (2+x1)∨
(−4 + x2) is shown there by a dotted line above the polyhedron, together with the optimal tropical
hyperplane (2 + x1) ∨ (−4 + x2) = 0. The bipartite digraph Gλ corresponding to this problem is
depicted in Fig. 3, where the nodes of Max are represented by squares and the nodes of Min by circles.
Note that in this case we havem = 7 and n = 2.
The equivalent homogeneous version of this problem (as described in Section 3.1) is to minimize
λ subject to uy ≤ λ + vy, Cy ≤ Dy, and y3 ≠ −∞, where C = [A, c], D = [B, d], u = (2,−4,−∞)
and v = (−∞,−∞, 0).
Thanks to Theorem 12, it is possible to certify that λ∗ = 0 is the optimal value of this problem.
To show this, consider the strategy τ for player Min defined by: τ(1) = 8, τ(2) = 4 and τ(3) = 4,
which is represented in bold in Fig. 3. Observe that the resulting subdigraph Gτλ∗ contains only one
cycle, which is accessible from node n + 1 of Min (indeed it passes through this node), has zero
weight and passes through nodem+ 1 of Max. Moreover, by Theorem 5, we have φ(λ∗) ≥ 0 because
y = (−2, 2, 0)T satisfies Cy ≤ Dy and uy ≤ λ∗ + vy = vy. Therefore, by Theorem 12, λ∗ = 0 is the
optimal value.
The special cases (28) of the tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27) have been
studied in (Butkovič and Aminu, 2008), where necessary and sufficient conditions for these problems
to be unboundedwere in particular given.We next show that under the assumptions of (Butkovič and
Aminu, 2008), which require the entries of all vectors and matrices to be finite, these conditions turn
out to be equivalent to the one given in Theorem 13.
Theorem 3.3 of (Butkovič and Aminu, 2008) shows that, when only finite entries are considered,
theminimization problem in (28) is unbounded if, and only if, c ≤ d. Under the finiteness assumption,
this condition is equivalent to the one given in Theorem13. To show this, in the first place observe that
in this case the associated digraphGλ (see Fig. 4) contains arcs connecting any node ofMin [n+1]with
any the node ofMax [m+1], with exception of the arc connecting node n+1with nodem+1, and arcs
1464 S. Gaubert et al. / Journal of Symbolic Computation 47 (2012) 1447–1478
Fig. 6. The maximization problem of Example 1: the tropical polyhedron and the spectral function.
connecting any node ofMax [m+1]with any node ofMin [n+1], with exception of the arcs connecting
nodem+ 1 with nodes in [n]. Thus, if we define the strategy σ for player Max by σ(i) = n+ 1 for all
i ∈ [m + 1], it can be checked that the only cycles in Gσ0 accessible from node n + 1 are of the form
n+ 1 → i1 → n+ 1 → · · · → n+ 1 → ik → n+ 1 for some i1, . . . , ik ∈ [m]. Since the weight of
such a cycle is di1 − ci1 + · · ·+ dik − cik , the strategy σ satisfies the conditions in Theorem 13 if c ≤ d.
Conversely, assume that a strategy σ for player Max satisfies the conditions in Theorem 13. Then, the
only possible value for σ(m+ 1) is n+ 1, and we must also have σ(i) = n+ 1 for all i ∈ [m], because
if σ(i) = j ≠ n+ 1 for some i ∈ [m], Gσ0 would contain the cyclem+ 1→ n+ 1→ i → j → m+ 1,
contradicting the fact that no cycle accessible from node n+ 1 of Min passes through node m+ 1 of
Max. Now, since Gσ0 contains the cycles n + 1 → i → n + 1 for i ∈ [m], which are accessible from
node n+ 1 of Min, the weights of these cycles di − ci must be nonnegative, implying that c ≤ d.
Regarding the maximization problem in (28), Theorem 3.4 of (Butkovič and Aminu, 2008) shows
that this problem is unbounded if, and only if, the system Ax ≤ Bx has a finite solution. In this case,
due to the finiteness assumption, it follows that the associated digraph Gλ (see Fig. 4) contains arcs
connecting any node ofMax [m+1]with any node ofMin [n+1], with exception of the arc connecting
nodem+ 1 with node n+ 1, and arcs connecting any node of Min [n+ 1]with any the node of Max
[m+1], with exception of the arcs connecting nodes in [n]with nodem+1. If the system Ax ≤ Bx has a
finite solution, from Theorem 5 and (17) it follows that there exists a strategy σ¯ : [m] → [n] such that
χ(A♯Bσ¯ ) = χ(A♯B) ≥ 0. By (19) and (20), this implies that any cycle in G¯σ¯ has nonnegative weight,
where G¯ is the bipartite digraph of the mean payoff game associated with the matrices A and B. If we
define the strategy σ(i) = σ¯ (i) for all i ∈ [m] and σ(m+ 1) = j for some j ∈ [n], then σ satisfies the
conditions of Theorem 13 because the cycles accessible from node n+1 of Min in Gσ0 are precisely the
cycles in G¯σ¯ and there is no cycle containing nodem+ 1 of Max in Gσ0 . Conversely, if a strategy σ for
player Max satisfies the conditions in Theorem 13, then necessarily we have σ(i) ∈ [n] for all i ∈ [m],
because if σ(i) = n+1 for some i ∈ [m],Gσ0 would contain the cycle n+1→ m+1→ j → i → n+1
where j = σ(m + 1) ∈ [n], contradicting the fact that there is no cycle in Gσ0 accessible from node
n + 1 of Min passing through node m + 1 of Max. Now, if we define σ¯ (i) = σ(i) for all i ∈ [m], the
cycles accessible from node n + 1 of Min in Gσ0 are precisely the cycles in G¯σ¯ , which therefore have
nonnegative weight. Then, by (19) and (20) we have χ(A♯Bσ¯ ) ≥ 0, and so from Theorem 5 and (17)
we conclude that the system Ax ≤ Bx has a finite solution.
Remark 7. If the strategies σ or τ and the scalar λ∗ are fixed (considered as inputs) the conditions of
Theorems 12 and 13, i.e., the validity of the certificates, can be checked in polynomial time.
To see this, in the first place assume that τ and λ∗ are given. Using Karp’s algorithm, compute the
maximal cycle mean of each strongly connected component of Gτλ∗ that is accessible from node n+ 1
of Min. The certificate is valid only if these maximal cycle means are nonpositive and one of them is
zero. To check the second condition of Theorem 12, delete nodem+1 ofMax (and the arcs adjacent to
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it) from Gτλ∗ and compute for the resulting digraph (using again Karp’s algorithm) the maximal cycle
mean of each strongly connected component accessible from node n+ 1 of Min. To be valid, all these
maximal cycle means must be negative. Observe that in Theorem 12 we also assume that φ(λ∗) ≥ 0.
By (30), this can be certified by a strategy σ for player Max such that the minimal cycle mean of any
strongly connected component of Gσλ∗ accessible from node n+1 of Min is nonnegative, which can be
checked by applying Karp’s algorithm to each of these components. By Theorem 5, another possibility
is to exhibit a vector y such that Cy ≤ Dy, uy ≤ λ∗ + vy and yn+1 ≠ −∞.
Assume now that σ is given. To check the validity of the certificate in Theorem 13, decompose first
Gσ0 in strongly connected components and see whether the component containing nodem+1 of Max
is trivial (i.e., contains just this node) or it is not accessible from node n+ 1 of Min. If this is the case,
compute the minimal cycle mean of each strongly connected component of Gσ0 accessible from node
n+ 1 of Min by applying Karp’s algorithm. Then, the certificate is valid if each of these minimal cycle
means is nonnegative.
3.4. Bisection and Newton methods for tropical linear-fractional programming
In (25), we need to find the least λ such that φ(λ) ≥ 0, where φ(λ) is nondecreasing and Lipschitz
continuous. Thus, we can consider certain classical methods for finding zeros of ‘‘good enough’’
functions of one variable. In particular, the bisection method for φ(λ) corresponds to the approach
of (Butkovič and Aminu, 2008). More specifically, it can be formulated as follows, when the finite
coefficients in (27) are integers.
Algorithm 1. Bisection method
Start. A point λ0 such that φ(λ0) ≥ 0 and a point λ0 such that φ(λ0) < 0.
Iteration k. Let λ = ⌈(λk−1 + λk−1)/2⌉. If φ(λ) ≥ 0, then set λk = λ and λk = λk−1. Otherwise,
set λk = λk−1 and λk = λ.
Stop. Verify λk − λk = 1. If true, return λk.
For this method, which uses that tropical linear-fractional programming preserves integrity
(Corollary 9 part (iv)), it is not important to know the actual value of φ(λ), but just whether φ(λ) ≥ 0,
i.e., whether Uy ≤ V (λ)y is solvable with yn+1 ≠ −∞.
Further, the concept of (left, right) optimal strategy, see Definition 11, yields an analogue of (left,
right) derivative, and leads to the following analogue of the Newtonmethod, which does not have any
integer restriction.
Algorithm 2. Positive Newton method
Start. A point λ0 such that φ(λ0) ≥ 0.
Iteration k. Find a left optimal strategy σ for playerMax atλk−1 and computeλk = min{λ ∈ Rmax |
φσ (λ) ≥ 0}.
Stop. Verify λk = λk−1 or λk = −∞. If true, return λk.
It remains to explain how each step of this algorithm can be implemented.We shall see that λk can
be easily computed (reduction to a shortest path problem) and that finding left optimal strategies can
be done by existing algorithms for mean payoff games.
For the sake of comparison, we state a dual version of Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 3. Negative Newton method
Start. A point λ0 such that φ(λ0) < 0.
Iteration k. Find a (right) optimal strategy τ for player Min at λk−1 and compute λk = min{λ ∈
Rmax | φτ (λ) ≥ 0}.
Stop. Verify φ(λk) = 0 or λk = +∞. If true, return λk.
Remark 8. Note that in Algorithm 3 we can use optimal strategies instead of right optimal ones,
because if τ is optimal at λk−1, we have φτ (λk−1) = φ(λk−1) < 0 and so λk > λk−1 by the definition
of λk (recall that by Theorem 8 all the spectral functions are nondecreasing and piecewise-linear).
This means that all the strategies considered in the iterations of Algorithm 3 are different, and as the
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number of strategies is finite, this algorithm must terminate in a finite number of steps. A similar
argument shows that we can also use optimal strategies in Algorithm 2 at points λk−1 where the
spectral function φ is strictly positive, because in that case we have λk < λk−1 even if σ is just optimal
and not left optimal (however, when φ(λk−1) = 0 and λk−1 is not optimal, only a left optimal strategy
at λk−1 guarantees λk < λk−1).
Remark 9. Due to Corollary 9 part (ii), the values λ+ := 2M(min(m, n) + 1) and λ− :=
−2M(min(m, n) + 1) can be first checked in the case of the positive and negative Newton methods,
respectively. We recall thatM is a bound on the absolute value of the coefficients in (27).
If φ(λ+) < 0 then the problem is infeasible, and if φ(λ−) > 0 then the problem is unbounded.
If φ(λ+) ≥ 0 and φ(λ−) < 0, then the problem is both feasible and bounded. The case φ(λ−) = 0
requires a left optimal strategy for player Max at λ− to decide that either this point is optimal, or the
problem is unbounded.
This rule of starting with ±2M(min(m, n) + 1), as we shall see, secures pseudo-polynomiality of
the instances of the mean payoff games generated by the bisection and Newton methods.
The following logarithmic bound on the complexity of the bisection method is standard and its
proof will be omitted.
Proposition 14. If the finite coefficients in (27) are integers with absolute values bounded by M, then the
number of iterations of the bisection method does not exceed log(4M(min(m, n)+ 1)) if it is started as in
Remark 9. Hence, the computational complexity of the bisection method in this case does not exceed
log(4M(min(m, n)+ 1))×MPGI(m+ 1, n+ 1,M + 2M(min(m, n)+ 1)).
Remark 10. Butkovič and Aminu (2008) give better initial values λ0 and λ0 for the bisection method
than±2M(min(m, n)+ 1), but only for the special cases (28), where all the coefficients are assumed
to be finite. These initial values depend on the input data and lie in the interval [−3M, 3M]. As
oracle, they exploit the alternatingmethod of Cuninghame-Green andButkovič (2003),which requires
O(mn(m+n)M) operations, being related to the value iteration of Zwick and Paterson (1996). Hence, in
this case, the complexity of the bisection method is no more than O(mn(m + n)M logM). In Sergeev
(2010), the same kind of initial values were obtained for the general formulation (21), leading to a
similar complexity, but with the same finiteness restriction on the coefficients. The initial values of
Butkovič and Aminu (2008) and Sergeev (2010) will be exploited in the numerical experiments, see
Section 4.3.
As observed above, in the case of the bisection method the mean payoff oracle is only required to
check whether φ(λ) ≥ 0.
In the case when the finite coefficients in (27) are real, the bisection method computes (λk−1 +
λk−1)/2 without rounding and it yields only an approximate solution to the problem. However,
Newton methods always converge in a finite number of steps.
Proposition 15. Denote by |S| and |T | the number of available strategies for players Max and Min,
respectively. Then,
(i) Algorithms 2 and 3 terminate in a finite number of steps, the number of which does not exceed |S| and
|T |, respectively.
(ii) If the finite coefficients in (27) are integers with absolute values bounded by M, then the values
λk produced by Algorithm 2 are also integer, and the number of iterations does not exceed
4M(min(m, n)+ 1) if it is started as in Remark 9.
Proof. (i) At different iterations of Algorithm 2 we have different strategies, because λk = min{λ ∈
Rmax | φσ (λ) ≥ 0} are different for all k. Similarly for Algorithm 3, with τ instead of σ . Thus, the
number of steps is limited by the number of strategies, which is finite.
(ii) The numbers λk generated by Algorithm 2 are integers due to Corollary 9 part (ii). By Remark 9,
we can start the algorithm at 2M(min(m, n) + 1), and it will finish before it reaches −2M(min
(m, n)+ 1). 
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A worst-case complexity bound, different from the number of strategies, will be given below in
Theorem 19, and it is worse than that of the bisection method above (see also Remark 10). First,
Newton iterations require more sophisticated oracles which compute the value of the game and a left
optimal strategy. Second, we have only used the integrality of the method in Proposition 15, so the
bound on the number of iterations is rough. However, the positive Newton method is an interesting
alternative to the bisection method, since it preserves feasibility. Therefore, it may be more sensitive
to the geometry of the feasible set, which is especially convenient if this set has only few generators
or its dimension is small. The experiments of Section 4.3 indicate that this is indeed the case, and the
worst-case complexity bound of Theorem 19 (using Proposition 15) is often too pessimistic. The main
reason to give the result of Theorem 19 is that it shows the method is pseudo-polynomial.
Not aiming to obtain a better overall worst-case complexity result, in the next subsection we will
rather consider the implementation of the positive Newton method, reducing the computation of λk
to a (polynomial-time solvable) shortest path problem. Section 3.6will be devoted to the computation
of left optimal strategies in the integer case by means of perturbed mean payoff games. As noticed in
Proposition 15, Newton iterations shouldwork also in the case of real coefficients. For this we propose
the algebraic approach of Section 3.7, encoding a perturbed game as a game over the semiring of
germs.
3.5. Newton iterations by means of Kleene star
In this subsection we show that in the case of Algorithm 2 the steps of the Newton method can be
performed by calculating least solutions of inequalities of the form z ≥ Ez ∨ h, as in Proposition 6.
Assume that we are at iteration k of Algorithm 2, so that we need to compute λk = min{λ ∈ Rmax |
φσ (λ) ≥ 0}, where σ is a left optimal strategy for player Max at λk−1. If we set V σ (λ) instead of V (λ)
in Uy ≤ V (λ)y, by Theorem 5 the minimal zero λk of φσ (λ) is exactly the least value of λ for which
this system is satisfied by some y ∈ Rn+1max with yn+1 ≠ −∞, i.e., we have
λk = min{λ ∈ Rmax | Uy ≤ V σ (λ)y, yn+1 ≠ −∞ is solvable}. (32)
The main idea is to compute this minimal zero by considering the system Uy ≤ V σ (λ)y directly. With
this aim, we shall need the following observation.
Lemma 16. Assume that at iteration k of Algorithm 2 we have l := σ(m+ 1) ≠ n+ 1, where σ is a left
optimal strategy for playerMax at λk−1. Then, if
(Uy ≤ V σ (λ)y and yn+1 ≠ −∞) =⇒ yl ≠ −∞, (33)
for all λ, it follows that
λk = min{λ ∈ Rmax | Uy ≤ V σ (λ)y, yl ≠ −∞ is solvable}. (34)
Otherwise, i.e., if Condition (33) does not hold, λk = −∞.
Proof. Condition (33) implies that the minimum in (34) is less than or equal to that in (32).
To show the converse, suppose that for some λ ∈ R there exists yˆ ∈ Rn+1max such that yˆl ≠ −∞
and Uyˆ ≤ V σ (λ)yˆ. Since φσ (λk−1) = φ(λk−1) ≥ 0, by Theorem 5 there exists a solution y˜ of
Uy ≤ V σ (λk−1)y (and so, in particular, of the first m inequalities of this system, i.e., Cy ≤ Dσ y) such
that y˜n+1 ≠ −∞. Then, for any β ∈ R the combination y = yˆ∨ y˜− β satisfies the firstm inequalities
in Uy ≤ V σ (λ)y (in other words, we have Cy ≤ Dσ y) as a tropical linear combination of solutions of
this system of tropically linear inequalities. Moreover, if β is sufficiently large, y also satisfies the last
inequality uy ≤ λ+vσ y of the system Uy ≤ V σ (λ)y because uyˆ ≤ λ+vσ yˆ and vσ yˆ = vl+ yˆl > −∞.
But then y satisfies Uy ≤ V σ (λ)y and yn+1 ≥ y˜n+1 − β ≠ −∞. This shows that the minimum in (32)
is less than or equal to that in (34).
Finally, if Condition (33) does not hold, for some λ¯ there exists a solution y¯ of the system Uy ≤
V σ (λ¯)y such that y¯n+1 ≠ −∞ but y¯l = −∞. Since uy¯ ≤ λ¯+ vσ y¯ = λ¯+ vl + y¯l, this can only happen
if uy¯ = −∞, which implies that y¯ satisfies Uy¯ ≤ V σ (λ)y¯ for any λ ∈ R, and so λk = −∞. 
We next show how to make sure that Condition (33) is satisfied. Note that this condition is not
satisfied if, and only if, for some λ the system Uy ≤ V σ (λ)y has a solution y¯ with y¯n+1 ≠ −∞
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but y¯l = −∞. The latter implies the existence of a solution y¯ of Cy ≤ Dy such that y¯i = −∞ for
all i ∈ supp(u), but y¯n+1 ≠ −∞ (so in particular Condition (33) is satisfied if n + 1 ∈ supp(u)).
Eliminating from the system Cy ≤ Dy the columns corresponding to the indices in supp(u), the
existence of such a solution is reduced to the solvability of a two-sided homogeneous system with
the condition yn+1 ≠ −∞, which can be decided using a mean payoff game oracle. If this problem
has no solution, then Condition (33) is satisfied. Otherwise, the value of the original tropical linear-
fractional programming problem is−∞.
As a consequence of the previous discussion, in what follows we assume that it has already been
checked that Condition (33) is satisfied, andwe explain how to performNewton iterations in that case.
Suppose that we are at iteration k of Algorithm 2, and let σ be a left optimal strategy at λk−1. Then,
if we set l := σ(m+ 1), by Lemma 16 we have
λk = min{λ ∈ Rmax | Uy ≤ V σ (λ)y, yl ≠ −∞ is solvable}.
Since the system Uy ≤ V σ (λ)y is satisfied by some y¯ with y¯l ≠ −∞ if, and only if, it is satisfied by
some yˆwith yˆl = 0 (it is enough to define yˆi = y¯i − y¯l for all i ∈ [n+ 1]), it follows that
λk = min{λ ∈ Rmax | Uy ≤ V σ (λ)y, yl = 0 is solvable}
= min{λ ∈ Rmax | Cy ≤ Dσ y, uy ≤ λ+ vl + yl, yl = 0 is solvable}.
Thus, setting yl = 0 we are in the situation of problem (28), because λk + vl is given by:
minimize px ∨ r
subject to: Ax ∨ c ≤ Bσ x ∨ dσ , x ∈ Rnmax (35)
where p ∈ Rnmax, r ∈ Rmax, c, dσ ∈ Rmmax and A, Bσ ∈ Rm×nmax are such that
U =

A c
p r

and V σ (λ) =

Bσ dσ
−∞ λ+ vl

.
Here, just for the simplicity of the presentation, column l is in the place of column n+1when l ≠ n+1
(in other words, the columns of A and Bσ are respectively the columns of C and Dσ with exception of
column l, c is column l of C , dσ is column l of Dσ , r = ul and pi = ui for i ≠ l).
We claim that the system of constraints (the second line) in (35) has a least solution, which
then minimizes px ∨ r , and we explain how to find it. First note that the constraints in (35) can be
written as:
(Ax)i ∨ ci ≤ biσ(i) + xσ(i), if σ(i) ≠ l,
(Ax)i ∨ ci ≤ di, if σ(i) = l. (36)
In order to find the least solution of this system, observe that the second subsystem can be
dispensed with. Indeed, since φσ (λk−1) = φ(λk−1) ≥ 0, by Theorem 5 there exists a solution y˜ of
Uy ≤ V σ (λk−1)y such that y˜n+1 ≠ −∞, and so this solution also satisfies y˜l ≠ −∞ (recall we assume
that Condition (33) holds). Then, if x˜ ∈ Rnmax is the vector defined by x˜i := y˜i − y˜l for i ≠ l, it follows
that x˜ is a solution of (36). Hence, if the first subsystem has the least solution x, we have x ≤ x˜ and so
x is also a solution of the second subsystem.
To show that the first subsystem in (36) has a least solution, first note that a system of two
inequalities of the form
r11 + x1 ∨ · · · ∨ r1n + xn ≤ x1
r21 + x1 ∨ · · · ∨ r2n + xn ≤ x1
is equivalent to just one inequality:
s1 + x1 ∨ · · · ∨ sn + xn ≤ x1,
where si = r1i ∨ r2i for i = 1, . . . , n. Using this kind of reduction, the first subsystem can be
transformed in no more thanm(n+ 1) operations to an equivalent system of the form
ExI ∨ FxJ ∨ h ≤ xI , (37)
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where xI is the sub-vector whose coordinates appear on the right-hand side of the first subsystem
in (36), and xJ is the sub-vector corresponding to the rest of the coordinates which are present in that
system. Since we are interested in the least solution, we can set xJ ≡ −∞, and then the remaining
system is just of the form
Ez ∨ h ≤ z, (38)
where z = xI . By Proposition 6, the least solution to this system in R|I| is given by
z = E∗h = h ∨ Eh ∨ E2h ∨ E3h ∨ · · ·
As x˜I satisfies (38), we have z ≤ x˜I and so z ∈ R|I|max.
Thus, we have the following method:
Algorithm 4. Solving (35)
Step 1. Split the system Ax ∨ c ≤ Bσ x ∨ dσ in two subsystems as in (36) and transform the first
subsystem to the form (37).
Step 2. Compute z = E∗h. Set xI = z and xJ ≡ −∞.
Step 3. Return px ∨ r .
We also conclude the following.
Proposition 17. The problemsmin{λ | φσ (λ) ≥ 0} can be solved in O(mn)+ O(n3) time.
Note that in general, a system of the form (36) is solvable in Rnmax if, and only if, the least solution
of the first subsystem belongs to Rnmax and satisfies the second subsystem.
Example 3. Consider the following tropical linear-fractional programming problem:
minimize λ
subject to: uy ≤ λ+ vy, Cy ≤ Dy, y4 ≠ −∞, y ∈ R4max, λ ∈ Rmax
where
C =
 −3 −4 −∞ −∞−1 −∞ −∞ 1−∞ −∞ −∞ 0
1 −∞ 0 −∞
 , D =
−∞ −∞ −∞ 0−∞ 0 −∞ −∞0 −∞ −∞ −∞
0 −∞ −∞ 3
 ,
u = (−∞, 0,−∞,−∞) and v = (3,−∞,−∞,−∞), so in this case we have m = 4 and n = 3
with the notation of Problem (27).
Before performing Newton iterations, we need to checkwhether the system Cy ≤ Dy has solutions
with y2 = −∞ but y4 ≠ −∞ (since supp(u) = {2}). By the second inequality of this system, it follows
that this is impossible. Hence, Condition (33) is satisfied and so we can use (34) in order to compute
λk. Moreover, in this example the Newton method requires no more than two iterations, since player
Max has only two strategies, which correspond to the two finite entries in the last row of D.
Assume that we start with λ0 = 0. Then, an optimal strategy σ for player Max at λ0 is given by:
σ(1) = 4, σ(2) = 2, σ(3) = 1, σ(4) = 4 and σ(5) = 1. Since l = σ(m+ 1) = σ(5) = 1, we have
λ1 = min{λ ∈ Rmax | Cy ≤ Dσ y, y2 = uy ≤ λ+ v1 + y1, y1 = 0 is solvable},
and so, setting y1 = 0, λ1 + v1 = λ1 + 3 is given by:
minimize y2
subject to: (y2 − 4) ∨ (−3) ≤ y4, (y4 + 1) ∨ (−1) ≤ y2, y4 ≤ 0, y3 ∨ 1 ≤ y4 + 3. (39)
Note that the system of constraints in (39), obtained by setting y1 = 0 in Cy ≤ Dσ y (i.e., in (36) the
first column plays the role of free term), reduces to
E

y2
y4

∨ Fy3 ∨ h ≤

y2
y4

, y4 ≤ 0,
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where
E =
−∞ 1
−4 −∞

, F =
−∞
−3

, h =
−1
−2

.
Since
E∗h =

0 1
−4 0
−1
−2

=
−1
−2

,
the least solution of the system of constraints in (39) is (y2, y3, y4)T = (−1,−∞,−2). Therefore, the
value of problem (39) is−1, and thus λ1 = −4. It can be checked that this is the optimal solution of
the tropical programming problem (and in particular, that σ is still a left optimal strategy for player
Max at λ1 = −4).
3.6. Computing left optimal strategies
In order to compute left optimal strategies, consider the mean payoff game associated with the
tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27), and let the weights λ+v of the arcs connecting
nodem+ 1 of Max with nodes of Min be replaced by λ− ϵ + v, where ϵ ∈ R. In this way, we obtain
a perturbed mean payoff game. For small enough ϵ > 0, the optimal strategies for this game are the
left optimal strategies required by the positive Newton iterations. Here, we will require the mean
payoff oracle to find optimal strategies, not just the value of the game. The complexity of such oracle
will be denoted by MPGI*(m, n,M), for mean payoff games with integer payments whose absolute
values are bounded byM , with m nodes of Max and n nodes of Min. A pseudo-polynomial algorithm
for computing optimal strategies of such games is described in (Zwick and Paterson, 1996).
Proposition 18. If the finite coefficients in (27) are integers with absolute values bounded by M, then at
each iteration of the positive Newton method, started and finished as in Remark 9, a left optimal strategy
can be found in
MPGI*(m+ 1, n+ 1, (min(m, n)+ 2)(M + 2M(min(m, n)+ 1))+ 1)
operations.
Proof. By Corollary 9, it follows that each λk is integer and the breaking points of φ(λ) are rational
numbers whose denominators do not exceed min(m, n) + 1. Therefore, optimal strategies for the
game at λ∗ = λk − 1/(min(m, n) + 2) are left optimal strategies at λk. Then, we only need to apply
a mean payoff oracle in order to compute optimal strategies for the perturbed mean payoff game
with ϵ = 1/(min(m, n) + 2). Multiplying (in the usual sense) the payments by min(m, n) + 2 we
obtain amean payoff gamewith integer payments andwith the same optimal strategies (in this sense,
equivalent to the perturbed game). The computation of optimal strategies in the latter game takes no
more than MPGI*(m+ 1, n+ 1, (min(m, n)+ 2)(M + 2M(min(m, n)+ 1))+ 1) operations, because
the payments in the perturbedmean payoff game are either of the form a or a+λk−ϵ, where |a| ≤ M
and |λk| ≤ 2M(min(m, n)+ 1), and these payments are multiplied by min(m, n)+ 2. 
Example 4. In order to find a left optimal strategy σ for playerMax at λk−1 = 0 in Example 3, we only
need to compute an optimal strategy for the associated game at λ∗ = λk−1 − 1/(min(m, n) + 2) =
−1/5. This can be done by solving the game whose payments are given by the matrices
−15 −20 −∞ −∞
−5 −∞ −∞ 5
−∞ −∞ −∞ 0
5 −∞ 0 −∞
−∞ 0 −∞ −∞
 and

−∞ −∞ −∞ 0
−∞ 0 −∞ −∞
0 −∞ −∞ −∞
0 −∞ −∞ 15
14 −∞ −∞ −∞
 ,
which are obtained by multiplying (in the usual sense) the payments for the game at λ∗ by 5.
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Remark 11. Proposition 18 was necessary to establish the pseudo-polynomiality of the positive
Newton method, which regularly uses left optimal strategies. However, as observed in Remark 8, the
use of left optimal strategies is not necessary when φ(λk) > 0. Moreover, when φ(λk) = 0 and
the coefficients are integers, an alternative to computing a left optimal strategy is to use an optimal
strategy, checkingwhetherφ(λk−1) < 0whenλk+1 = λk. In that case, Corollary 9 part (ii) guarantees
that λk is optimal. Otherwise, proceed with λk+1 := λk− 1. With this modification, the complexity of
the computation of optimal strategies falls to
MPGI*(m+ 1, n+ 1,M + 2M(min(m, n)+ 1)),
instead of the bound of Proposition 18.
We are now ready to sum up the computational complexity of the positive Newton method with
left optimal strategies.
Theorem 19. If the finite coefficients in (27) are integers with absolute values bounded by M, then the
positive Newton method, started and finished as in Remark 9, takes no more than
O(M min(m, n))× (O(mn)+ O(n3)
+ MPGI*(m+ 1, n+ 1, (min(m, n)+ 2)(M + 2M(min(m, n)+ 1))+ 1))
operations. In particular, the positive Newton method is pseudo-polynomial.
Proof. As the numbers λk generated by the positive Newton method are integers and lie within
[−2M(min(m, n)+1), 2M(min(m, n)+1)], the number of iterations does not exceed 4M(min(m, n)+
1)+ 1. Combining this with Propositions 17 and 18, we get the claim. 
Note that Remark 11 can be used to reduce the bound of Theorem 19, if the left optimal strategies
are not used, getting rid of the factor (min(m, n)+ 2) in the third argument of MPGI*.
3.7. Perturbed mean payoff games as mean payoff games over germs
Next we discuss an alternative to the perturbation technique of the previous subsection: instead
of considering the mean payoff game for several values of the perturbation parameter, we may
consider a mean payoff game the payments of which belong to a lattice ordered group of germs.
In a nutshell, the elements of this group encode infinitesimal perturbations of the payments. This
algebraic structure allows one to deal more generally with one-parameter perturbed games (not
only the ones arising from tropical linear-fractional programming). A similar structure appeared
in (Gaubert and Gunawardena, 1998). This is somehow analogous to the perturbation methods used
to avoid degeneracy in linear programming. We hope to develop this further in a subsequent work.
The materials of this subsection are not used in the rest of the paper. However, this alternative can be
useful in two respects: (1) to develop the present Newton method in the case of real coefficients, (2)
to improve the complexity result of the previous subsection.
Consider amean payoff game over germs, finite-duration version, where the weights of arcs in G are
pairs of real numbers (a, b) endowed with lexicographic order:
(a1, b1) ≤lex (a2, b2)⇔

a1 < a2, or
a1 = a2, b1 ≤ b2, (40)
and the componentwise addition is used to calculate the weights of paths (or cycles). These games
correspond to two-sided tropical linear systems over the semiring of germs Gmax := R2 ∪
{(−∞,−∞)}, where for g1 = (a1, b1), g2 = (a2, b2) ∈ Gmax we define ‘‘g1 + g2’’ := max(g1, g2)
following (40) and ‘‘g1g2’’ := (a1 + a2, b1 + b2).
With a game over germs we associate an ϵ-perturbed mean payoff game, for ϵ ≥ 0, in which
the weights (a, b) of the arcs are replaced by a + ϵb. If the payments in a mean payoff game over
germs are given by the matrices A and B (with entries inGmax), then the matrices associated with the
corresponding ϵ-perturbed mean payoff game will be denoted by A(ϵ) and B(ϵ), respectively.
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Proposition 20. Suppose that the matrices of payments in a mean payoff game over germs (finite-
duration version) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. Then this game has a value and positional optimal strategies
(meaning that (6) holds formean payoff games over germs).Moreover, if (χi, κi) is the value of such a game,
then there exists ϵ > 0 such that for any 0 < ϵ < ϵ the associated ϵ-perturbed mean payoff game has
value χi + ϵκi and these games have common positional optimal strategies.
Proof. Note that if the matrices of payments A and B in a mean payoff game over germs satisfy
Assumptions 1 and 2, then for any ϵ-perturbed mean payoff game the corresponding matrices A(ϵ)
and B(ϵ) also satisfy these assumptions.
Let δ be theminimal absolute value of nonzero differences between cyclemeans in themean payoff
game with payments given by A(0) and B(0), and let M be the greatest absolute value of the second
component of germs. Define ϵ := δ/4M and consider any ϵ such that 0 < ϵ < ϵ.
By (6), for the ϵ-perturbed mean payoff game there exist positional strategies σ ∗ and τ ∗ such that
ΦA(ϵ),B(ϵ)(j, τ ∗, σ ) ≤ ΦA(ϵ),B(ϵ)(j, τ ∗, σ ∗) ≤ ΦA(ϵ),B(ϵ)(j, τ , σ ∗)
for all (not necessarily positional) strategies σ and τ . Let σ be any strategy for player Max and assume
thatΦA(ϵ),B(ϵ)(j, τ ∗, σ ) = a+ ϵb andΦA(ϵ),B(ϵ)(j, τ ∗, σ ∗) = χj+ ϵκj. If a = χj, we have b ≤ κj because
a + ϵb ≤ χj + ϵκj. Otherwise (i.e., if a ≠ χj), since |b|, |κj| ≤ 2M , |a − χj| ≥ δ, ϵ < ϵ = δ/4M , and
a + ϵb ≤ χj + ϵκj, it follows that a < χj. Therefore, we conclude that ΦA,B(j, τ ∗, σ ) = (a, b) ≤lex
(χj, κj) = ΦA,B(j, τ ∗, σ ∗). The same argument shows that ΦA,B(j, τ ∗, σ ∗) ≤lex ΦA,B(j, τ , σ ∗) for any
strategy τ for player Min. This proves that the finite duration version of the mean payoff game over
germs has a value, given by (χj, κj), and that positional optimal strategies for the ϵ-perturbed mean
payoff game (with ϵ < ϵ) are also optimal for the game over germs.
Assume now that σ ∗ and τ ∗ are positional optimal strategies for the finite duration version of the
mean payoff game over germs, and let (χj, κj) be its value. Then, ΦA,B(j, τ ∗, σ ) ≤lex (χj, κj) ≤lex
ΦA,B(j, τ , σ ∗) for all strategies σ and τ (not necessarily positional).
Let σ be any strategy for playerMax and assume thatΦA,B(j, τ ∗, σ ) = (a, b). If a = χj, we conclude
b ≤ κj because ΦA,B(j, τ ∗, σ ) ≤lex (χj, κj), and thus ΦA(ϵ),B(ϵ)(j, τ ∗, σ ) = a + ϵb ≤ χj + ϵκj
for any ϵ ≥ 0. Suppose now that a < χj. Since |b|, |κj| ≤ 2M and χj − a ≥ δ, it follows that
ΦA(ϵ),B(ϵ)(j, τ ∗, σ ) = a + ϵb ≤ χj + ϵκj for any ϵ such that 0 < ϵ < ϵ. The same argument shows
that ΦA(ϵ),B(ϵ)(j, τ , σ ∗) ≥ χj + ϵκj for any strategy τ for player Min and any ϵ such that 0 < ϵ < ϵ.
Therefore, we conclude that σ ∗ and τ ∗ are positional optimal strategies for the ϵ-perturbed mean
payoff game and that its value is χj + ϵκj. This proves the claim. 
Remark 12. Proposition 20 opens the way to using mean payoff games over germs in order to find
right or left optimal strategies in the Newtonmethods. In that case, note that the second component of
all finite weights must be set to 0 except for the arcs connecting nodem+1 ofMaxwith nodes of Min,
where it is set to 1 (for right optimality) or to−1 (for left optimality). This raises the issue of developing
a direct combinatorial algorithm to solve mean payoff games over germs. Such an algorithm would
avoid the perturbation technique of the previous subsection. This will be discussed elsewhere.
Example 5. By Proposition 20, in Example 3 we could find a left optimal strategy σ for player Max
at λk−1 = 0 computing an optimal strategy for the mean payoff game over germs whose matrices of
payments are:
(−3, 0) (−4, 0) −∞G −∞G
(−1, 0) −∞G −∞G (1, 0)
−∞G −∞G −∞G (0, 0)
(1, 0) −∞G (0, 0) −∞G
−∞G (0, 0) −∞G −∞G
 and

−∞G −∞G −∞G (0, 0)
−∞G (0, 0) −∞G −∞G
(0, 0) −∞G −∞G −∞G
(0, 0) −∞G −∞G (3, 0)
(3,−1) −∞G −∞G −∞G
 ,
where−∞G := (−∞,−∞).
Remark 13. Proposition 20 extends (6) to germs. Note that this equation provides a very crude
algorithm for computing values and optimal strategies. Further idea is to allow more general
algorithms, showing that they can be applied to mean payoff games over germs. This will be
investigated elsewhere.
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4. Examples
4.1. Minimization
We next apply the positive Newton method to the minimization problem of Example 2. Recall
that the equivalent homogeneous version of this problem is to minimize λ subject to uy ≤ λ + vy,
Cy ≤ Dy, and y3 ≠ −∞, with C = [A, c], D = [B, d], u = (2,−4,−∞) and v = (−∞,−∞, 0),
where the matrices A, B and the vectors c, d are given in Example 2 (also recall that in this example,
m = 7 and n = 2). Note that in this case, for any strategy σ for player Max, the only possible value
for l := σ(m + 1) = σ(8) is n + 1 = 3. Then, at each iteration k of the positive Newton method
applied to this problem, in order to compute λk + vl = λk we need to minimize (2+ y1)∨ (−4+ y2)
subject to the system obtained by setting y3 = 0 in Cy ≤ Dσ y, as explained in Section 3.5. The latter
is Problem (35) for this particular case.
We start the positive Newton method with λ0 = 15, where φ(λ0) = 5.5. The function σ(1) = 1,
σ(2) = 1, . . . , σ(7) = 1 and σ(8) = 3 is an optimal strategy for player Max at λ0. To perform the first
Newton iteration, we find the minimal solution of the system
0 ≤ x1 − 2, 0 ≤ x1, 0 ≤ 1+ x1, x2 − 4 ≤ x1,
(x2 − 3) ∨ 0 ≤ x1 + 2, x2 − 3 ≤ x1, x2 − 2 ≤ x1,
which is (x1, x2) = (2,−∞). The next value is λ1 = (2 + x1) ∨ (−4 + x2) = 4. Then, φ(λ1) = 1.5
and σ(1) = 2, σ(2) = 2, σ(3) = 1, σ(4) = 1, σ(5) = 1, σ(6) = 3, σ(7) = 3 and σ(8) = 3 is a new
optimal strategy for player Max. For the next Newton iteration, we find the minimal solution of the
system
0 ≤ x2, 0 ≤ x2 − 1, 0 ≤ 1+ x1, x2 − 4 ≤ x1,
(x2 − 3) ∨ 0 ≤ x1 + 2, x2 − 5 ≤ 0, x2 − 6 ≤ 0,
which is (x1, x2) = (−1, 1). Then, the next value is λ2 = (2+ x1)∨ (−4+ x2) = 1. Now φ(λ2) = 0.5
and σ(1) = 2, σ(2) = 2, σ(3) = 2, σ(4) = 1, σ(5) = 3, σ(6) = 3, σ(7) = 3 and σ(8) = 3 is the
optimal strategy for player Max. For the next Newton iteration, we find the minimal solution of the
system
0 ≤ x2, 0 ≤ x2 − 1, 0 ≤ x2 − 2, (x2 − 3) ∨ 0 ≤ x1 + 2,
x2 − 4 ≤ 0, x2 − 5 ≤ 0, x2 − 6 ≤ 0,
which is (x1, x2) = (−2, 2). This gives λ3 = (2+ x1)∨ (−4+ x2) = 0, which is the optimal value λ∗.
The optimality of λ∗ = 0 can be certified applying Theorem 12, see Example 2 above.
The vectors (2,−∞), (−1, 1) and (−2, 2) found by the Newton iterations are indicated on the
left-hand side of Fig. 5 as ‘‘1’’, ‘‘2’’ and ‘‘3’’.
The right-hand side of Fig. 5 displays the graph of φ(λ), together with the Newton iterations. The
graphs of partial spectral functions φσ (λ) are given by red dashed lines.
4.2. Maximization
Consider the maximization problem of Example 1. We next apply the positive Newton method to
the homogeneous version (29) of the equivalent minimization problem.
With this aim, firstly observe that in this case n + 1 = 3 ∈ supp(u) = {3}, and so Condition (33)
is always satisfied. Therefore, as explained in Section 3.5, at each iteration of the positive Newton
method applied to this problem, λk + vl can be computed by minimizing y3 subject to the system
obtained by setting yl = 0 in Cy ≤ Dσ y, which corresponds to Problem (35) in the case of this example.
Let us take λ0 = 3. Then, we obtain that σ(1) = 3, σ(2) = 3, σ(3) = 3, σ(4) = 3 and σ(5) = 2
is an optimal strategy for player Max at λ0. To perform the Newton iteration we first notice that
l = σ(m + 1) = σ(5) = 2, which means that λ1 + v2 = λ1 + 3 is the minimum of y3 subject
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Fig. 7. Number of iterations of the Newton method (thin blue line) and the bisection method (thin red line) in the cases of
minimization (left) and maximization (right). Thick blue line: average number of iterations of the Newton method for each
interval of 20 dimensions. Thick red line: level log(2M) ≈ 10. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
to the system obtained by setting y2 = 0 in Cy ≤ Dσ y, as explained above. Thus, we have to find the
minimal solution of the following system:
x3 ≥ −1, x3 ≥ (−2+ x1) ∨ (−2), x3 ≥ −1+ x1, x3 ≥ x1,
which is (x1, x3) = (−∞,−1). The full vector y = (−∞, 0,−1) is a translate of y+ 1 = (x1, x2, 0),
where (x1, x2) = (−∞, 1) is marked as ‘‘1’’ at the left of Fig. 6. Meanwhile we obtain λ1 = x3 − 3 =−4, and σ(1) = 1, σ(2) = 3, σ(3) = 2, σ(4) = 2 and σ(5) = 2 is now a new optimal strategy for
player Max. Again, here l = σ(m + 1) = σ(5) = 2 and so the second columns of C and Dσ are the
free terms in (35). We have to find the minimal solution of the following system:
x1 ≥ −1, x3 ≥ (−2+ x1) ∨ (−2), 0 ≥ −1+ x1, 2 ≥ x1,
which is (x1, x3) = (−1,−2). We obtain λ2 = x3 − 3 = −5, which is the optimal value, and so
the value of the original maximization problem is 5. The full vector y = (−1, 0,−2) is a translate of
y+ 2 = (x1, x2, 0), where (x1, x2) = (1, 2) is marked as ‘‘2’’ at the left of Fig. 6.
As in the case of Fig. 5, the right-hand side of Fig. 6 displays the graph of φ(λ), together with the
Newton iterations. The graphs of partial spectral functions φσ (λ) are given by red dashed lines.
4.3. Numerical experiments
A preliminary implementation of the bisection and Newton methods for tropical linear-fractional
programming was developed in MATLAB. We next present some graphs showing how they behave
on randomly generated instances of tropical linear-fractional programming problems, in which the
entries of matrices and vectors range from −500 to 500. The matrices A and B in (28) and (26) are
square, with dimensions ranging from 1 to 400.
Fig. 7 displays the cases of the tropical linear programming (28), in which all the entries are finite.
Here the certificates of unboundedness reduce to the solvability of a two-sided tropical system of
inequalities. When a feasible and bounded problem is generated, it is solved by the bisection and
Newton methods.
For the bisectionmethod, we use the lower initial values λ0 of (Butkovič and Aminu, 2008), see also
Remark 10. Following (Butkovič andAminu, 2008), the upper initial valuesλ0 for the bisectionmethod
come from a solution of Ax∨ c ≤ Bx∨ d. To find this solution, we use the policy iteration of (Dhingra
and Gaubert, 2006) instead of the alternating method of (Cuninghame-Green and Butkovič, 2003).
Shown by the thin red line (up to m = n = 250), the bisection method worked similarly in the case
of minimization and maximization. In our experiments, the interval between lower and upper initial
values never exceeded 2M = 1000, with the number of iterations quickly approaching a constant
level of 9 or 10 iterations (logM ≈ 9 or log 2M ≈ 10).
The thin blue line represents the run of theNewtonmethod, and the thick blue line represents their
average number calculated for each interval of 20 dimensions. For the sake of fair comparison with
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Fig. 8. Number of iterations of the Newton method (thin blue line) and the bisection method (thin red line) in the case of
minimization with M = 500000. Thick blue line: average number of iterations of the Newton method for each interval of 20
dimensions. Thick red line: level log(2M) − 1 ≈ 19. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 9. Number of iterations of the Newton method (thin blue line) and the bisection method (thin red line) in the cases of
linear-fractional programming with finite entries (right) and when the average proportion of −∞ entries is 0.7 (left). Thick
blue line: average number of iterations of the Newton method for each interval of 20 dimensions. Red line on the left: level
log(2M) ≈ 10. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
this article.)
the bisection method, the initial value λ0 coincides with the upper initial value λ0 for the bisection
method. This value comes from a solution of Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d, instead of the theoretical value
2M(n + 1), which depends on n and may be much greater. In the case of minimization, the average
number of Newton iterations slowly grows, being smaller than 10 before n ≈ 250, but exceeding
10 at larger dimensions. Naturally, the number of iterations for the same dimension may be very
different, depending on the configuration and complexity of the tropical polytopes (i.e., the solution
sets of Ax∨ c ≤ Bx∨d). In the case of maximization, the number of iterations is usually below 5. Note
that maximization is resolved immediately if we find the greatest point of the solution set, which
suggests that the maximization problem may be simpler. We also remark that there is no correlation
between the number of iterations of the bisection and Newton methods. In particular, it is easy to
construct instanceswith large integers inwhich the number of bisection iterations becomes arbitrarily
large, whereas the number of Newton iterations remains bounded. This agrees with Fig. 8, where in
comparison to the graph on the left-hand side of Fig. 7,M is equal to 500 000 instead of 500.
Fig. 9 displays the cases of tropical linear-fractional programming (26) with all entries finite (right)
andwith a 0.7 frequency of−∞ entries (left). In the case of−∞ entries, as required by Assumptions 1
and 2, we ensure that the set of constraints contains neither−∞ rows on the right-hand side nor−∞
columns on the left-hand side. The case of tropical linear-fractional programming with finite entries
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shows almost the same picture as in the case ofminimization above. The casewhen−∞ appears with
a regular frequency is even more favorable for the Newton method, due to the sparsity of G.
5. Conclusion
In this paper,wedeveloped an algorithm to solve tropical linear-fractional programmingproblems.
This is motivated by the works (Allamigeon et al., 2008; Allamigeon, 2009), in which disjunctive
invariants of programs are computed by tropical methods: tropical linear-fractional programming
problems are needed to tropicalize the method of templates introduced by Sankaranarayanan et al.
(2005, 2006).
The main technical ingredient, which combines ideas appearing in Akian et al. (2009); Allamigeon
et al. (2011b); Gaubert and Sergeev (2010) is to introduce a parametric zero-sum two-player game (in
which the payments depend on a scalar variable), in such a way that the value of the initial tropical
linear-fractional programming problem coincideswith the smallest value of the variable forwhich the
game is winning for one of the players. The value of the parametric game, which we call the spectral
function, is a piecewise affine function of the variable. Then, the problem is reduced to finding the
smallest zero of the spectral function, which we do by a Newton-type algorithm, in which at each
iteration, we solve a one-player auxiliary game.
Using this game-theoretic connection, we present concise certificates expressed in terms of
the strategies of both players, allowing one to check whether a given feasible solution is optimal,
or whether the tropical linear-fractional programming problem is unbounded. This is inspired
by Allamigeon et al. (2011b), in which certificates of the same nature were given for the simpler
problem of certifying whether a tropical linear inequality is a logical consequence of a finite family of
such inequalities.
We also develop a generalization of the bisectionmethod of Butkovič and Aminu (2008). The latter,
as well as the Newton method, are shown to be pseudo-polynomial. Note that at each iteration, both
methods call an oracle solving a mean payoff game problem (for which the existence of a polynomial
time algorithm is an open question—only pseudo-polynomial algorithms are known). The pseudo-
polynomial bound thatwe give for the Newtonmethod isworse than the one concerning the bisection
method, however, for the former we also give a non pseudo-polynomial bound, involving the number
of strategies, which is better than the pseudo-polynomial bound if the integers of the instance are very
large. This is confirmed by experiments, with a preliminary implementation, which indicates that the
Newton method scales better as the size of the integers grows. In addition, it has the advantage of
maintaining feasibility, and there are significant special instances in which it converges in very few
iterations.
The Newton method of this paper appears as a natural product of the game-theoretic connection
and the spectral function approach. We further concentrate on the implementation of each Newton
step by reduction to optimal path algorithms, and on the proof of pseudo-polynomiality. This method
could be also considered in the framework ofmore abstract Newtonmethods in a generalized domain,
which also means making decent comparison with other Newton schemes, like (Esparza et al., 2008).
The comparison of Newton and bisection methods, as well as possible alternative approaches, also
remain to be further examined.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank the anonymous reviewers for numerous important suggestions, which helped
us to improve the presentation of this paper. The authors are also grateful to Peter Butkovič for many
useful discussions concerning tropical linear programming and tropical linear algebra. The first author
thanks Xavier Allamigeon and Éric Goubault for having shared with him their insights on disjunctive
invariants and static analysis. The first author was partially supported by the Arpege programme of
the FrenchNational Agency of Research (ANR), project ‘‘ASOPT’’, number ANR-08-SEGI-005 and by the
Digiteo project DIM08 ‘‘PASO’’ number 3389. The third author was partially supported by the EPSRC
grant RRAH12809 and the RFBR-CNRF grant 11-01-93106. This work was initiated when this author
was with the School of Mathematics at the University of Birmingham.
S. Gaubert et al. / Journal of Symbolic Computation 47 (2012) 1447–1478 1477
References
Adjé, A., Gaubert, S., Goubault, E., 2010. Coupling policy iteration with semi-definite relaxation to compute accurate numerical
invariants in static analysis. In: Gordon, A.D. (Ed.), Programming Languages and Systems, 19th European Symposium on
Programming, ESOP 2010. In: Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 6012. Springer, pp. 23–42.
Akian, M., Gaubert, S., Guterman, A., 2009. Tropical polyhedra are equivalent to mean payoff games. Int. J. Algebra and Comput.,
doi:10.1142/S0218196711006674, e-print arXiv:0912.2462.
Allamigeon, X., November 2009 Static analysis of memory manipulations by abstract interpretation—Algorithmics of
tropical polyhedra, and application to abstract interpretation. Ph.D. Thesis. École Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France,
http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/Labo/Xavier.Allamigeon/papers/thesis.pdf.
Allamigeon, X., Gaubert, S., Goubault, E., 2008. Inferring min and max invariants using max-plus polyhedra. In: Proceedings of
the 15th International Static Analysis Symposium. SAS’08. In: Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 5079. Springer, Valencia,
Spain, pp. 189–204.
Allamigeon, X., Gaubert, S., Goubault, É, 2010. The tropical double description method. In: Marion, J.-Y., Schwentick, T. (Eds.),
Proceedings of the 27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science. STACS 2010. In: Leibniz
International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), vol. 5. Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Dagstuhl,
Germany, pp. 47–58.
Allamigeon, X., Gaubert, S., Katz, R.D., 2011a. The number of extreme points of tropical polyhedra. J. Comb. Theory Ser. A 118,
162–189. e-print arXiv:0906.3492.
Allamigeon, X., Gaubert, S., Katz, R.D., 2011b. Tropical polar cones, hypergraph transversals, and mean payoff games. Linear
Algebra Appl. 435 (7), 1549–1574. e-print arXiv:1004.2778.
Baccelli, F. L., Cohen, G., Olsder, G.-J., Quadrat, J.-P., 1992. Synchronization and Linearity: an Algebra for Discrete Event Systems.
Wiley.
Bezem, M., Nieuwenhuis, R., Rodríguez-Carbonell, E., 2008. Themax-atom problem and its relevance. In: Cervesato, I., Veith, H.,
Voronkov, A. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and
Reasoning. LPAR’08. In: Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 5330. Springer, pp. 47–61.
Bezem, M., Nieuwenhuis, R., Rodríguez-Carbonell, E., 2010. Hard problems in max-algebra, control theory, hypergraphs and
other areas. Inform. Process. Lett. 110, 113–138.
Bjorklund, H., Vorobyov, S., 2007. A combinatorial strongly subexponential strategy improvement algorithm for mean payoff
games. Discrete Appl. Math. 155, 210–229.
Briec, W., Horvath, C., 2004. B-convexity. Optimization 53, 103–127.
Butkovič, P., 2010. Max-linear Systems: Theory and Algorithms. Springer.
Butkovič, P., Aminu, A., 2008. Introduction to max-linear programming. IMA J. Manag. Math. 20 (3), 233–249.
Cochet-Terrasson, J., Cohen, G., Gaubert, S., Gettrick, M.M., Quadrat, J.P., 1998. Numerical computation of spectral elements
in max-plus algebra. In: Proceedings of the IFAC conference on systems structure and control. IRCT, Nantes, France,
pp. 699–706.
Cochet-Terrasson, J., Gaubert, S., Gunawardena, J., 1999. A constructive fixed-point theorem for min–max functions. Dyn. Stab.
Syst. 14 (4), 407–433.
Cohen, G., Gaubert, S., Quadrat, J.P., 2004. Duality and separation theorems in idempotent semimodules. Linear Algebra Appl.
379, 395–422. e-print arXiv:math.FA/0212294.
Costan, A., Gaubert, S., Goubault, E., Martel, M., Putot, S., 2005. A policy iteration algorithm for computing fixed points in
static analysis of programs. In: Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification. CAV’05.
In: LNCS, vol. 3576. Springer, pp. 462–475.
Cousot, P., Halbwachs, N., 1978. Automatic discovery of linear restraints among variables of a program. In: Conference Record
of the Fifth Annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages. ACM Press, New York, NY,
Tucson, Arizona, pp. 84–97.
Cuninghame-Green, R., Butkovič, P., 2003. The equation A⊗ x = B⊗ y over (max,+). Theoret. Comput. Sci. 293, 3–12.
Cuninghame-Green, R.A., 1979.Minimax Algebra. In: Lecture Notes in Economics andMathematical Systems, vol. 166. Springer,
Berlin.
Develin, M., Sturmfels, B., 2004. Tropical convexity. Doc. Math. 9, 1–27 (electronic). e-print arXiv:math.MG/0308254.
Dhingra, V., Gaubert, S., 2006. How to solve large scale deterministic games withmean payoff by policy iteration. VALUETOOLS.
In: Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Performance EvaluationMethodolgies and Tools, vol. 180. Pisa, Italy,
article No. 12.
Ehrenfeucht, A., Mycielski, J., 1979. Positional strategies for mean payoff games. Int. J. Game Theory 8 (2), 109–113.
Esparza, J., Gawlitza, T., Kiefer, S., Seidl, H., 2008. Approximative methods for monotone systems of min–max-polynomial
equations. In: Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP’08, Part
I., pp. 698–710.
Friedmann, O., August 2009. An exponential lower bound for the parity game strategy improvement algorithm as we know it.
In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science. LICS 2009. IEEE Computer
Society Press, pp. 145–156.
Gaubert, S., Goubault, E., Taly, A., Zennou, S., 2007. Static analysis by policy iteration on relational domains. In: Proceedings of
the Sixteenth European Symposium Of Programming. ESOP’07. In: LNCS, vol. 4421. Springer, pp. 237–252.
Gaubert, S., Gunawardena, J., 1998. The duality theorem for min–max functions. C. R. Acad. Sci., Paris. I 326, 43–48.
Gaubert, S., Katz, R. D., 2009. The tropical analogue of polar cones. Linear Algebra Appl. 431 (5-7), 608–625. e-print
arXiv:0805.3688.
Gaubert, S., Plus, M., March 1997. Methods and applications of (max,+) linear algebra. In: Reischuk, R., Morvan, M. (Eds.),
Proceedings of the 14th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science. STACS’97. In: Lecture Notes in
Comput. Sci., vol. 1200. Springer, Lübeck, pp. 261–282.
Gaubert, S., Sergeev, S., 2010. The level set method for the two-sided eigenproblem. e-print arXiv:1006.5702.
1478 S. Gaubert et al. / Journal of Symbolic Computation 47 (2012) 1447–1478
Gawlitza, T., Seidl, H., 2007. Precise relational invariants through strategy iteration. In: Duparc, J., Henzinger, T.A. (Eds.),
Computer Science Logic, 21st International Workshop, CSL 2007, 16th Annual Conference of the EACSL. Lausanne,
Switzerland, September 11-15, 2007, Proceedings. In: LNCS, vol. 4646. Springer, pp. 23–40.
Gurvich, V.A., Karzanov, A.V., Khachiyan, L.G., 1988. Cyclic games and an algorithm to find minimax cycle means in directed
graphs. USSR Comput. Math. Math. Phys. 28 (5), 85–91.
Heidergott, B., Olsder, G.-J., van der Woude, J., 2005. Max-plus at Work. Princeton Univ. Press.
Joswig, M., 2005. Tropical halfspaces. In: Combinatorial and computational geometry. In: Math. Sci. Res. Inst. Publ., vol. 52.
Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, pp. 409–431. e-print arXiv:math.CO/0312068.
Katz, R. D., 2007. Max-plus (A, B)-invariant spaces and control of timed discrete event systems. IEEE Trans. Aut. Control 52 (2),
229–241. e-print arXiv:math.OC/0503448.
Kohlberg, E., 1980. Invariant half-lines of nonexpansive piecewise-linear transformations. Math. Oper. Res. 5 (3), 366–372.
Liggett, T. M., Lippman, S. A., 1969. Stochastic games with perfect information and time average payoff. SIAM Rev. 11, 604–607.
Litvinov, G. L., Maslov, V. P., Shpiz, G. B., 2001. Idempotent functional analysis: An algebraic approach. Math. Notes (Moscow)
69 (5), 758–797. e-print arXiv:math.FA/0009128.
Miné, A., December 2004. Weakly relational numerical abstract domains. Ph.D. Thesis, École Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France,
http://www.di.ens.fr/~mine/these/these-color.pdf.
Möhring, R.H., Skutella, M., Stork, F., 2004. Scheduling with AND/OR precedence constraints. SIAM J. Comput. 33 (2), 393–415.
electronic.
Puri, A., 1995. Theory of hybrid systems and discrete event systems. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Berkeley.
Sankaranarayanan, S., Colon, M., Sipma, H. B., Manna, Z., January 2006. Efficient strongly relational polyhedral analysis.
In: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation. VMCAI’06. In: Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 3855.
Springer, Charleston, SC, pp. 111–125.
Sankaranarayanan, S., Sipma, H. B., Manna, Z., January 2005. Scalable analysis of linear systems using mathematical
programming. In: Verification, Model Checking and Abstract Interpretation. VMCAI’05. In: Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci.,
vol. 3385. pp. 25–41.
Sergeev, S., 2010. Mean-payoff games and parametric tropical two-sided systems. University of Birmingham, School of
Mathematics, Preprint 2010/15. Available online from http://web.mat.bham.ac.uk/P.Butkovic/Grant.html.
Zimmermann, K., 1977. A general separation theorem in extremal algebras. Ekonom.-Mat. Obzor (Prague) 13, 179–201.
Zimmermann, K., 2005. Solution of some max-separable optimization problems with inequality constraints. In: Litvinov, G.,
Maslov, V. (Eds.), IdempotentMathematics andMathematical Physics, vol. 377. AmericanMathematical Society, Providence,
pp. 363–370.
Zimmermann, U., 1981. Linear and Combinatorial Optimization in Ordered Algebraic Structures. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Zwick, U., Paterson, M., 1996. The complexity of mean payoff games on graphs. Theoret. Comput. Sci. 158 (1–2), 343–359.
